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Article 
Mental Illness and the Second Amendment 
CLAYTON E. CRAMER 
In the past, American laws seldom attempted to regulate the 
possession of firearms by the mentally ill.  This surprising tradition 
has waned following a recent series of highly-publicized mass 
murders that were committed by persons who were identifiably 
mentally ill before the crime occurred.  These tragedies have focused 
attention on the question of how a free society should handle the 
conflict between the Second Amendment’s “right of the people” and 
the needs of public safety.  This Article examines why mental health-
related firearm regulations suddenly became necessary, analyzes the 
attendant conflicts between civil liberties and public safety, and 
suggests some strategies to deal with these conflicts. 
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Mental Illness and the Second Amendment 
CLAYTON E. CRAMER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It should not be surprising that severe mental illness and the 
commission of violent crimes, including murder, are strongly correlated in 
the United States.1  Multiple studies of those charged or convicted of 
violent crimes in other countries have likewise found that the severely 
mentally ill commit a disproportionate number of such crimes.2  Most 
                                                                                                                          
* Adjunct Faculty, College of Western Idaho.  Cramer authored such books as Armed America: 
The Remarkable Story of How and Why Guns Became as American as Apple Pie and Concealed 
Weapon Laws of the Early Republic: Dueling, Southern Violence, and Moral Reform, which was cited 
in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3132 (2010).  Among 
other articles, he co-authored Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did “Bear Arms” 
Mean in the Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511 (2008), which was cited in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 588 (2008), and Clayton E. 
Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson & George A. Mocsary, “This Right Is Not Allowed by Governments That 
Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the Second Amendment when the Fourteenth 
Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823 (2010), which was cited in Justice Alito’s 
majority opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3039 n.21, 3041 n.25, 3043 (2010).  
Cramer’s most recent book is My Brother Ron: A Personal and Social History of the 
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill, which combines a scholarly history of mental illness laws and 
the experiences of his family when his older brother suffered a schizophrenic breakdown in the 1970s.  
He thanks George Mocsary, Dave Hardy, Basil Copeland, Robin Roberts, Casey Smith, Cassandra 
Beckman Widay, Jeffrey Wisner, and Ryan Carpenter for their comments and suggestions in 
connection with this Article. 
1 See, e.g., Jeanne Y. Choe et al., Perpetration of Violence, Violent Victimization, and Severe 
Mental Illness: Balancing Public Health Concerns, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 153, 161 (2008) 
(surveying a host of empirical studies and concluding that “violence and violent victimization are more 
common among persons with severe mental illness than in the general population”); Eric B. Elbogen & 
Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence and Mental Disorder: Results from the National 
Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152, 155 
(2009) (finding in a study of over 34,653 U.S. subjects that “people with any severe mental illness” 
were 2.96 times more likely to have a history of violence than the general population); Larry 
Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Reconsidered in View of the New Legal 
Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 33, 39 (1978) (showing 
that in San Mateo County, California, mental patients were 55 times more likely to be arrested for 
murder than the general population in 1973; 82.5 times more likely to be arrested for murder in 1972; 
and 9 times more likely to be arrested for rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary from 1972 to 
1973); Larry Sosowsky, Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Mental Patients: A Cautionary 
Note, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602, 1602–05 (1980) (finding that mental patients with no prior arrest 
record were five times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes than members of the general 
population). 
2 See, e.g., Patricia A. Brennan et al., Major Mental Disorders and Criminal Violence in a Danish 
Birth Cohort, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 494, 494–500 (2000) (examining all mental 
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national studies of prisoners in the United States report that “approximately 
one-quarter . . . of offenders suffer[] from mental health problems 
including a history of inpatient hospitalization and psychiatric diagnoses.”3  
That is more than two times the rate of mental health disorders in adults in 
the general U.S. population.4 
A study of Indiana murder convicts found that 18% were severely 
mentally ill, and suffered from “schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder, 
major depression, mania, or bipolar disorder.”5  Of these murder convicts, 
5.2% were specifically diagnosed with schizophrenia,6 as compared to 
1.1% of the overall adult U.S. population.7  Similarly, the Oregon 
Department of Corrections recently reported that 22.8% of its offenders 
either suffer from “severe” mental health problems or exhibit the “highest 
need” for treatment.8 
Admittedly, studies based on arrests or prison populations are likely to 
suffer from sampling bias problems, as those who are mentally ill might be 
arrested by the police based on assumptions of criminal tendencies.9  But 
                                                                                                                          
hospitalization and criminal offense records for a cohort of Danish persons born between January 1, 
1944, and December 31, 1947, and finding that “[a]pproximately 2.2% of the men in the cohort were 
hospitalized for a major mental disorder and committed 10% of the violent crimes committed by all the 
men in the cohort; 2.6% of the women had been hospitalized for a major mental disorder and 
committed 16% of the violent crimes committed by women in the cohort”); Seena Fazel et al., Bipolar 
Disorder and Violent Crime: New Evidence from Population-Based Longitudinal Studies and 
Systematic Review, 67 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 931, 934 (2010) (explaining that Swedish bipolar 
disorder patients were 2.3 times more likely to be convicted of violent crimes than the general 
population); Seena Fazel & Martin Grann, The Population Impact of Severe Mental Illness on Violent 
Crime, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1397, 1399–1400 (2006) (finding in a study of Swedish mental patients 
that schizophrenics were 6.3 times more likely to be convicted of violent crimes than untreated persons, 
and that individuals with “other psychoses” were 3.2 times more likely to be convicted of violent 
crimes); Pamela J. Taylor & John Gunn, Homicides by People with Mental Illness: Myth and Reality, 
174 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 9, 10 (1999) (gathering studies demonstrating that disproportionate rates of 
homicide were committed by schizophrenics in multiple European countries from as early as 1900 to as 
late as 1980); Cameron Wallace et al., Criminal Offending in Schizophrenia Over a 25-Year Period 
Marked by Deinstitutionalization and Increasing Prevalence of Comorbid Substance Use Disorders, 
161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 716, 718 (2004) (noting that Australian schizophrenia patients were 3.2 times 
more likely to have been convicted of a violent offense than persons in a control group). 
3 Robert D. Morgan et al., Treating Offenders with Mental Illness: A Research Synthesis, 36 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 (2012). 
4 See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 
OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 3 (2006) (estimating that 11% of the U.S. population has a mental 
disorder). 
5 See Jason C. Matejkowski et al., Characteristics of Persons with Severe Mental Illness Who 
Have Been Incarcerated for Murder, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 74, 76 (2008) (referring to 
95 persons out of a sample size of 518 persons). 
6 See id. at 80 (referring to 27 persons out of a sample size of 518 persons). 
7 Schizophrenia, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1schiz.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
8 Inmate Population Profile for 3/01/2014, OR. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.oregon.gov/doc
/RESRCH/docs/inmate_profile.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2014). 
9 Amy C. Watson et al., Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward and Decisions About Persons with 
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other studies have examined violence across society at large, with one such 
study breaking down a sample of 10,059 people by diagnosis and self-
reported violent behavior.10  The following table shows the total relative 
violence levels for males and females in 1997: 
TABLE 111 
Group 
Total 
Number 
Total 
Number 
Violent 
Total % 
Violent 
Relative 
to No 
Disorder 
No disorder 7871 148 1.88% 1.00 
Anxiety 
disorders 1444 74 5.12% 2.73 
Major affective 
disorder or 
schizophrenia 408 43 10.53% 5.60 
Alcohol or 
drug disorder 741 157 21.18% 11.27 
 
Of particular interest is the comparison of the severely mentally ill 
(i.e., those placed in the “major affective disorder or schizophrenia” group) 
to those suffering from alcohol or drug disorders.  In this study, those with 
alcohol or drug disorders were more likely to be violent.12  Unsurprisingly, 
federal law prohibits the sale of firearms or ammunition to a person who is 
“an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,”13 and further 
makes it unlawful for any such person to “possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition.”14  Other surveys of violence rate 
studies likewise suggest that the severely mentally ill are 
                                                                                                                          
Mental Illness, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 49, 53 (2004) (concluding that police officers too often 
question the credibility of persons with mental illness and often exaggerate perceptions of 
dangerousness that escalate situations). 
10 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence from 
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, in VIOLENT BEHAVIOR & MENTAL ILLNESS: A COMPENDIUM 
OF ARTICLES FROM PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES AND HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 20, 23 
(Carl C. Bell ed., 1997). 
11 Id. at 25 tbl.3. 
12 Swanson et al., supra note 10, at 24 tbl.2.  Contrary to the popular perception that marijuana 
makes users mellow and alcohol makes users violent, there was only a small difference between the 
violence percentage for the “cannabis abuse or dependence” group (19.25%) and the “alcohol abuse or 
dependence” group (24.57%).  Both groups were markedly less violent than individuals with “other 
drug abuse or dependence” (34.74%).  Id. 
13 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) (2012). 
14 Id. § 922(g)(3).   
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disproportionately violent.15   
Some contend that those suffering only from mental illness may not be 
especially violent, but that the combination of mental illness and substance 
abuse poses the greatest risk.16  Yet even researchers who control for 
substance abuse and conclude that the mentally ill are no more violent than 
individuals without mental illness acknowledge that “[m]ental disorder has 
a significant effect on violence by increasing people’s susceptibility to 
substance abuse.  When first discharged, patients were twice as likely as 
their neighbors to be abusing substances, and alcohol and drugs raised the 
risk of violence for patients abusing them even more than for others.”17   
Another study showed that substance abuse disorder comorbid with 
severe mental illness was an important part of the violence problem, and 
further acknowledged: “Major mental disorder without alcohol or drug 
abuse complications emerged as a quite rare condition in the 
community.”18  At the same time, this “quite rare condition . . . was 
significantly more common among persons who reported that they had 
committed assaultive acts. . . . [T]he odds ratio for mental illness [alone] in 
the violent group exceeded 3.5.”19  Thus, while severe mental illness alone 
may not be the strongest determinant of violence, it is still a significant risk 
factor by itself, as well as a reliable proxy for identifying those who have a 
great risk of violence because of the high rates of comorbidity with 
substance abuse. 
Others argue that the connection between mental illness and violence 
is illusory.20  The Interfaith Disability Advocacy Coalition (“IDAC”) 
claims that “misconceptions about mental illness can cause discrimination 
and unfairly hamper the recovery of the nearly 20 percent of all adult 
Americans who experience a mental illness each year.”21  While there are 
many Americans with mild mental illness problems, such as depression or 
anxiety disorders, studies of violence and mental illness are typically 
                                                                                                                          
15 E.g., Frederick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear 
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2013). 
16 See, e.g., Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 1, at 155 (“Individuals with severe mental illness and 
substance abuse and/or dependence posed a higher risk than individuals with either of these disorders 
alone.  The highest risk was shown for dual-disordered subjects with a history of violence, who showed 
nearly 10 times higher risk of violence compared with subject with severe mental illness only.”). 
17 John Monahan et al., The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study Revisited: Two Views Ten 
Years After Its Initial Publication, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 147, 149 (2008). 
18 Jeffrey W. Swanson, Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and Community Violence: An 
Epidemiological Approach, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT 101, 111 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994).   
19 Id.  
20 INTERFAITH DISABILITY ADVOCACY COALITION, GROUNDED IN FAITH: RESOURCES ON 
MENTAL HEALTH AND GUN VIOLENCE 2–3 (2013), available at http://www.aapd.com/assets/grounded-
in-faith.pdf. 
21 Id. at 8. 
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careful to distinguish the most severe illnesses from these less serious 
problems.22  The IDAC’s claim runs contrary to the bulk of evidence 
concerning prevalence of severe mental health disorders.23  It is also 
apparent that the IDAC is concerned about perceived connections between 
mental illness and violence causing stigmatization—in addition to being 
concerned about how such connections might derail efforts toward gun 
control laws aimed at the general public.24 
Not all mental illnesses are severe, and at least some who are suffering 
from severe mental illness are not necessarily a hazard to self or others.  
Figuring this out for any particular individual requires care and discretion, 
and occasionally mistakes are made in both directions, i.e., some people 
who are not dangerous are hospitalized, while others who are dangerous 
fail to be hospitalized.  There are no perfect solutions to this.  A society 
must decide where to draw the line between “too strict” and “too lax” 
when it comes to public safety decisions. 
Other methods of examining the relationship between mental illness 
and murder demonstrate that there is a statistically significant correlation 
that strongly suggests a causal relationship.25  Bernard E. Harcourt’s 
examination of aggregate national institutionalization rates—calculated by 
adding the prison population to that of mental hospitals—and murder rates 
from 1928 to 2000 found an astonishingly strong negative correlation 
between the two variables: –0.78.26  As the total institutionalization rate 
rose, murder rates fell, and vice versa.27  Harcourt urged that “including 
mental health data in the rate of institutionalization—rather than using 
prison rates only—is likely to have significant effects on the study of the 
                                                                                                                          
22 See supra Table 1. 
23 While different research yields somewhat different results, attempts to reconcile prevalence 
studies show that 18.5% of Americans suffer from any mental or substance abuse disorder, William E. 
Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence Estimates of Mental Disorders in the United States, 59 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 115, 119 (2002), which is indeed IDAC’s “nearly 20 percent.”  Most of these 
disorders, however, while troubling to the sufferer, are not associated with the high violent crimes 
discussed earlier.  See id. at 121 tbl.4 (noting that 5.1% suffered from “[a]ny mood disorder,” which 
includes bipolar disorder, and 1.0% suffered from “[s]chizophrenia/schizophreniform”).  For different 
methods of categorizing the severity of mental illnesses, see Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence, 
Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-Month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 619 (2005) (finding in a study of 9282 respondents 
that 2432 (26.2%) had a disorder meeting the criteria for a twelve-month DSM mental disorder and 
that, among those with a disorder, 542 (22.3%) were classified as “serious”).  
24 INTERFAITH DISABILITY ADVOCACY COALITION, supra note 20, at 2, 4–6.  
25 The ninety-five percent confidence interval is commonly used as a first test of whether a 
relationship between variables might indicate a causal connection.  WARREN S. BROWNER, PUBLISHING 
AND PRESENTING CLINICAL RESEARCH 60–61 (2d ed. 2006). 
26 Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1766 (2006). 
27 See id. at 1765 (describing the aggregated institutionalized rate as an inverted plot of the 
homicide trend line). 
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relationship between confinement and crime during the twentieth 
century.”28  Even when he adjusted for changes in unemployment and the 
fluctuating fraction of the population that was at peak violent crime age, 
the negative correlation remained strong and better predicted both the 
1960s rise and the 1990s decline in murder rates than the other models 
traditionally used by criminologists.29  In a follow-up study, where 
Harcourt used state-level data for institutionalization and murder rates and 
controlled for even more variables, the statistically significant negative 
correlation remained for forty-four states.30  A few states—such as 
Florida—showed no significant correlation between institutionalization 
rates and murder rates.31 
Another study came to similar conclusions about the relationship 
between murder rates and mental illness.  Steven P. Segal of the University 
of California at Berkeley’s School of Social Welfare studied state-to-state 
variations in 2004 murder rates and mental health care, while controlling 
for firearms restrictions and socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic 
data.32  He found that less access to psychiatric inpatient beds and poorly 
rated mental health systems were respectively associated with increases in 
the homicide rates by 1.08 and 0.26 per 100,000 people.33  Since the 
national average homicide rate was 5.9 per 100,000 people in 2004,34 
greater access to inpatient beds is clearly quite important in reducing 
homicide rates; poorly rated mental health systems also matter, just less 
dramatically.  Segal also found interesting differences based on variations 
in involuntary civil commitment (“ICC”) laws.  Broader ICC-criteria were 
associated with 1.42 fewer homicides per 100,000 people, which was a bit 
less than one-quarter of the national homicide rate.35  In short, states where 
involuntary commitment of the mentally ill was relatively easy had 
significantly fewer murders than states where it was more difficult.36 
                                                                                                                          
28 Id. at 1773. 
29 Id. at 1767, 1771.  
30 Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution 
Part II: State Level Analysis 48 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper 
No. 335, 2007), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/335.pdf. 
31 Id. at 43. 
32 Steven P. Segal, Civil Commitment Law, Mental Health Services, and U.S. Homicide Rates, 47 
SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1449, 1449–50 (2012). 
33 Id. at 1449.   
34 Underlying Cause of Death, 1999–2010 Request, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (group results by 
“ICD-10 113 Cause List”; select year “2004”; then, under ICD-10 codes, open “V01-Y89”; then select 
“X85-Y09”; then click “send”).  In 2010, the most recent year for which data is available, the homicide 
rate was 5.2 per 100,000 people.  Id. (group results by “ICD-10 113 Cause List”; select year “2010”; 
then, under ICD-10 codes, open “V01-Y89”; then select “X85-Y09”; then click “send”). 
35 Segal, supra note 32, at 1455–56. 
36 See id. at 1457 (finding a need for criteria facilitating early preventative intervention for people 
with serious mental illness). 
 2014] MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1309 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in nine parts.  Part II further 
sets forth the connection between mental illness and violence, and 
discusses the public’s perception of mass murders.  Parts III and IV lay out 
the history and current state of mental illness-related firearms regulation.  
Parts V and VI describe the deinstitutionalization movement and its 
consequences for both the mentally ill and the public.  Part VII assesses 
whether, in current or historical context, there is a conflict between the 
rights of the mentally ill and the Second Amendment.  Part VIII examines 
serious due process concerns raised by some current mental health-related 
regulations.  Part IX concludes that reversing deinstitutionalization while 
ensuring that mental hospitals are humane places will serve both the 
mentally ill and prevent a significant amount of public violence.  
II.  MENTAL ILLNESS AND MURDER IN CONTEMPORARY NEWS HEADLINES 
The empirical studies present persuasive evidence that there is a 
connection between severe mental illness and violence.  While most 
severely mentally ill people are not dangerous, the popular perception of 
such a connection is not simply prejudice, but represents a very real 
difference between the severely mentally ill and the general population.  
A.  A Bridge Between Empirical Studies and Public Consciousness 
The results of the empirical studies mentioned above should not take 
us by surprise as a society, particularly in light of the tremendous media 
attention given to murders committed by the severely mentally ill.  
Consider, for example, the Indiana study that indicated schizophrenics—
whose symptoms include hallucinations and delusions—were 
overrepresented among murderers.37  In 2008, a schizophrenic named 
Vince Li beheaded and cannibalized a fellow bus passenger in Manitoba 
because he believed that he was “the second coming of Jesus” and his 
mission was to save the Earth from extraterrestrial invasion.38  Similarly, 
Russell Eugene Weston, Jr. explained to a court-appointed psychiatrist that 
he shot two U.S. Capitol Police officers to death in 1999 to prevent the 
spread of a disease by cannibals.39  Like many of the schizophrenics who 
make local, national, or even international headlines, Weston had a long 
history of mental illness well known to family, mental health workers, and 
                                                                                                                          
37 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text; see also Peter F. Liddle, The Symptoms of Chronic 
Schizophrenia: A Re-examination of the Positive-Negative Dichotomy, 151 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 145, 
147 (1987) (discussing the division of general symptoms of schizophrenia). 
38 Greyhound Killer Believed Man He Beheaded Was an Alien, CBC NEWS (May 22, 2012), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/greyhound-killer-believed-man-he-beheaded-was-an-alien-
1.1131575. 
39 Bill Miller, Capitol Shooter’s Mind-Set Detailed, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 1999), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/weston042399.htm. 
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police, but had not been hospitalized for any great length of time.40 
In 2000, the New York Times studied one hundred “rampage” killers in 
the United States.41  The study found there was often plenty of advance 
warning related to mental illness: 
Most of them left a road map of red flags, spending months 
plotting their attacks and accumulating weapons, talking 
openly of their plans for bloodshed.  Many showed signs of 
serious mental health problems.  The Times’ study found that 
many of the rampage killers . . . suffered from severe 
psychosis, were known by people in their circles as being 
noticeably ill and needing help, and received insufficient or 
inconsistent treatment from a mental health system that 
seemed incapable of helping these especially intractable 
patients.42 
Of the one hundred murderers studied, forty-seven “had a history of mental 
health problems” before committing murder, twenty had been previously 
hospitalized for mental illness, and forty-two had been previously seen by 
professionals for their mental illness.43  It is possible that many of the fifty-
three who did not have a history of mental health problems were also 
mentally ill.  The lack of mental illness history for those fifty-three may be 
the result of an absence of evidence, and not necessarily evidence of 
absence.  For example, some of the individuals simply may not have come 
to the attention of law enforcement or mental health professionals.  While 
family and friends are often aware of serious mental illness problems 
earlier than professionals, mentally ill persons sometimes estrange 
themselves from family and friends, making it more difficult for a forensic 
evaluation to locate evidence of mental illness. 
B.  High-Profile Mass Murders Linked to Mental Illness Since 2000 
Since 2000, multiple mass murders have anecdotally confirmed what 
the New York Times found: people that commit random acts of mass 
murder are usually suffering from severe mental illness.  In 2003, an 
employee of the Postal Service, Jennifer San Marco, was removed from 
her Goleta, California, workplace because she was acting strangely and 
                                                                                                                          
40 See Clayton E. Cramer, Madness, Deinstitutionalization & Murder, 13 ENGAGE 37, 37–40 
(2012), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/madness-deinstitutionalization-murder 
(detailing a list of murders by the mentally ill). 
41 Laurie Goodstein & William Glaberson, The Well-Marked Roads to Homicidal Rage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A1.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
 2014] MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1311 
then placed on psychological disability.44  San Marco moved to Milan, 
New Mexico, where neighbors said she “shouted furiously to herself,” 
“knelt in prayer at the roadside,” and “peeled off her clothes in random 
parking lots.”45  One neighbor who had worked in mental health clinics for 
eighteen years reportedly called the police in hopes that San Marco would 
receive a mental health evaluation, but the police stated they lacked a 
record of the call.46  San Marco returned to the Goleta mail sorting facility 
in January 2006 and murdered five employees before taking her own life.47  
She purchased the guns and ammunition used in the shooting from two 
New Mexico pawn shops—following clearance of a background check.48 
In April 2007, Seung-Hui Cho murdered thirty-two students and 
faculty at Virginia Tech before taking his own life.49  Some of Cho’s 
professors had previously noticed that something was not right with him, 
including the English department’s chairman who reported to “campus 
police and administrators . . . her worries about Cho’s antisocial behavior 
and disturbingly violent writing.”50  In 2005, Cho was detained by campus 
police following stalking incidents and a report that he seemed suicidal.51  
Thereafter, a special judge considered whether Cho should be involuntarily 
committed and concluded that he was an imminent danger to himself and 
others.52  Cho was taken to a hospital and received a court-ordered medical 
examination, but he denied having suicidal thoughts or other concerning 
symptoms.53  Cho was deemed free to leave the hospital and went back to 
live on campus in a world of paranoid schizophrenia.54  Because he was 
not involuntarily committed to a hospital, Cho’s name did not appear on 
the FBI’s firearms background checklist, and he was able to purchase 
handguns that he used in the largest firearm mass murder in U.S. history.55 
                                                                                                                          
44 Martin Kasindorf, Woman Kills 5, Self at Postal Plant, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2006), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-01-31-postal-shooting_x.htm. 
45 Dan Frosch, Woman in California Postal Shootings Had History of Bizarre Behavior, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at A19. 
46 Id. 
47 Kasindorf, supra note 44. 
48 Associated Press, Postal Killer Believed She Was Target of a Plot, NBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2006), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11167920/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/postal-killer-believed-she-was-
target-plot/#.U4S4-f3Fkds. 
49 Nancy Shute, What Went Wrong?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 30, 2007, at 42.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.; see Michael Welner, Cho Likely Schizophrenic, Evidence Suggests,                                 
ABC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/VATech/cho-schizophrenic-evidence-
suggests/story?id=3050483&singlePage=true (reporting that a forensic psychiatrist “believe[d] the 
evidence strongly supports that Cho had paranoid schizophrenia”).  
55 Josh Horwitz, Expanding Background Checks Necessary, but Not Enough,                   
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-horwitz/expanding-
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In April 2009, Jiverly Wong murdered thirteen people at a 
Binghamton, New York, immigrant assistance center before also killing 
himself.56  Letters from Wong to local news media demonstrated what Dr. 
Vatsal Thakkar, assistant professor of psychiatry at New York University’s 
Langone Medical Center, described as “major mental illness, quite 
possibly paranoid schizophrenia.”57 
In January 2011, Jared Lee Loughner opened fire on a crowd at a 
public meet-and-greet with Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and her 
constituents, killing six and injuring thirteen.58  Loughner had a history of 
incidents with police and was expelled from college for bizarre actions.59  
Despite his frightening behavior, he apparently was never hospitalized—
even for observation—until he made himself nationally infamous.60  A 
series of disturbing web postings and YouTube videos also confirm that 
Loughner’s grasp on reality was severely impaired.61  Court-ordered 
psychiatric evaluations concluded that Loughner suffered from 
schizophrenia and was incompetent to stand trial.62  Eventually, he was 
well enough to stand trial and pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty.63 
                                                                                                                          
background-chec_b_4554161.html; Editorial, Close the Loophole Cho Sneaked Through, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Apr. 25, 2007), http://hamptonroads.com/node/255931.  
56 Austin Fenner et al., “I Am Shooting—Have a Nice Day”—Shocking Letter Reveals Spree 
Killer’s Paranoia, N.Y. POST, Apr. 7, 2009, at 7. 
57 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58 Jacques Billeaud, Loughner Pleads Not Guilty, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 25, 2011, at A5. 
59 Brian Skoloff & Jacques Billeaud, Arizona Shooting Suspect Spiraled into Madness, GAZETTE 
(Montreal, Can.), Mar. 28, 2013, at A14; Tim Steller, Man Linked to Giffords Shooting Called “Very 
Disturbed,” ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Jan. 8, 2011), http://azstarnet.com/news/local/crime/man-linked-to-
giffords-shooting-rampage-called-very-disturbed/article_91db5db4-1b74-11e0-ba23-
001cc4c002e0.html. 
60 See Tim Steller, Sr. Reporter: Tucson Hospital Says Loughner Wasn’t a Patient, ARIZ. DAILY 
STAR (May 9, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://azstarnet.com/news/blogs/senor-reporter/sr-reporter-tucson-
hospital-says-loughner-wasn-t-a-patient/article_050f92b2-7a68-11e0-b623-001cc4c03286.html (noting, 
contrary to previous reports, that no prior records existed of Loughner being hospitalized for his mental 
health problems); College Asked ATF About Loughner Before Rampage, CBS NEWS (May 20,          
2011) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/college-asked-atf-about-loughner-before-rampage/ (noting that 
Loughner’s college administrators ordered him to get a mental health evaluation before returning to 
campus and described his behavior as “bizarre” and “intimidating”). 
61 David A. Fahrenthold & Clarence Williams, Tucson Shooting Suspect Jared Loughner Appears 
to Have Posted Bizarre Messages, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/08/AR2011010803961.html.  Loughner “left a series of postings and 
homemade videos that laid out a fervent, though largely incoherent, set of political views.”  Id.  In one 
of his YouTube videos, Loughner stated: “I can’t trust the current government because of the 
ratifications: the government is implying mind control and brainwash on the people by controlling 
grammar.”  Id.  Some of Loughner’s videos are still available on the Internet.  Classitup10, 
Introduction: Jared Loughner, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHoaaLb
qB4. 
62 Craig Harris & Michael Kiefer, Judge Finds Jared Loughner Incompetent to Stand Trial, 
AZCENTRAL (May 25, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/05/25/20110525gabriel-
giffords-shot-jared-loughner-competncy-hearing.html.  
63 Michael Martinez & Kyung Lah, Loughner Pleads Guilty to 19 Counts in Tucson, Arizona, 
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 James Holmes, a neurosciences graduate student at the University of 
Colorado, open fired in a movie theater on the night of July 20, 2012, 
killing twelve and injuring fifty-eight others.64  Holmes’s problems were 
serious enough for his psychiatrist at the medical school, Dr. Lynne 
Fenton, to break doctor-patient confidentiality and alert the police, who 
took no action.65  Because Dr. Fenton broke doctor-patient confidentiality 
to contact the police, it is reasonable to assume that Holmes 
“communicated to [her] a serious threat of imminent physical violence 
against a specific person or persons.”66  This exception to doctor-patient 
confidentiality outlines the only way Dr. Fenton could disclose Holmes’s 
threat to law enforcement, and yet the police’s failure to commit Holmes to 
a seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation period suggests that they 
believed he was not “an imminent danger to others.”67 
Certainly, the most disturbing of these recent mass murders occurred in 
December 2012 in Newtown, Connecticut.  Adam Lanza had some sort of 
psychiatric disorder, but his childhood diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome68 
is not typically associated with violent crime.69  Some reports describe 
Lanza as suffering from sensory integration disorder (“SID”), where 
sensory inputs overwhelm the brain.70  There is sizable overlap between 
the description of SID and the sensory problems that appear to be part of 
schizophrenia71—enough to wonder if Lanza was edging into 
                                                                                                                          
Mass Shooting, CNN (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/07/us/arizona-loughner-plea/. 
64 Colo. Shooting Suspect James Holmes’ Lawyers: He’s Mentally Ill, CBS NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colo-shooting-suspect-james-holmes-lawyers-hes-mentally-ill/. 
65 Id. 
66 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (2013). 
67 Id. § 27-65-105.   
68 Alice Park, Don’t Blame Adam Lanza’s Violence on Asperger’s, TIME (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://time.com/19957/adam-lanzas-violence-wasnt-typical-of-aspergers/. 
69 See Daniel C. Murrie et al., Asperger’s Syndrome in Forensic Settings, 1 INT’L J. FORENSIC 
MENTAL HEALTH 59, 61 (2002) (noting the existence of an intense debate about “whether Asperger’s 
patients are truly more prone to violence,” but observing that the vast majority of those diagnosed do 
not commit violent crimes); Press Release, Interagency Autism Coordinating Comm., Statement of the 
Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC) Related to the Sandy 
Hook Tragedy (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://iacc.hhs.gov/news/press_releases/2012/iacc_sandy_h
ook_statement_122112.pdf (“There is no scientific evidence linking [autism spectrum disorder] with 
homicides or other violent crimes.”).  But see Barbara G. Haskins & J. Arturo Silva, Asperger’s 
Disorder and Criminal Behavior: Forensic-Psychiatric Considerations, 34 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 374, 378 (2006) (“Violent behavior among children, adolescents, and even adults 
with [Asperger’s] is not uncommon.”). 
70 Adam Clark Estes, Revelations About Adam Lanza’s Mental Health Still Don’t Explain the 
Violence, THE WIRE (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/02/revelations-about-
adam-lanzas-mental-health-still-dont-explain-violence/62317/. 
71 See Peter Falkai et al., Pathophysiology of Schizophrenia, in SCHIZOPHRENIA: CURRENT 
SCIENCE AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 31, 42 (Wolfgang Gaebel ed., 2011) (discussing “dysfunction “of 
the cortico-cerebellar-thalamic-cortical neuronal circuit” and its role in filtering sensory information); 
Anthony J. Rissling & Gregory A. Light, Neurophysiological Measures of Sensory Registration, 
Stimulus Discrimination, and Selection in Schizophrenia Patients 284–46, in BEHAVIORAL 
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schizophrenia or if Lanza’s psychiatrist was reluctant to diagnose this 
devastating illness until he was certain of it.  Early reports indicated that 
Lanza’s mother was attempting to have him hospitalized and this may have 
provoked the crime.72 
Americans have recently mourned yet another tragedy at the Navy 
Yard in Washington, D.C., where Aaron Alexis murdered twelve people 
before dying in a gun battle with police on September 16, 2013.73  In the 
months before, Alexis had given increasingly clear signs of serious mental 
illness, including paranoia, sleep disorders, and “hearing voices” in his 
head.74   
These highly publicized incidents only represent a few of the mass 
murders committed in the United States by persons with signs of severe 
mental illness.  A comprehensive accounting of such tragedies since 2000 
would be dozens of pages long.  During this same period, even larger mass 
murders have been committed by the mentally ill in other countries, such 
as Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik, who murdered 77 people and 
wounded 242.75 
C.   The Question of Foreseeability: Why These Mass Murders Are 
Considered Disproportionately Important to Public Policy  
Relative to the overall murder rate in the United States, murders 
committed by the mentally ill amount to a small fraction, and the public 
mass murders that receive so much media attention are an especially tiny 
                                                                                                                          
NEUROBIOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA AND ITS TREATMENT 283, 284–86 (Neal R. Swerdlow, ed., 2010) 
(discussing the relationship between sensory input processing and schizophrenia); see also Andrew 
Solomon, The Reckoning: The Father of Sandy Hook Killer Searches for Answers, NEW YORKER (Mar. 
17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/03/17/140317fa_fact_solomon?currentPage=all 
(noting that Adam Lanza’s father now suspects that his son’s Asperger’s Syndrome may have “veiled” 
or “mask[ed]” schizophrenia). 
72 Jana Winter, Fear of Being Committed May Have Caused Connecticut Gunman to Snap, FOX 
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/18/fear-being-committed-may-have-
caused-connecticut-madman-to-snap/ (reporting that Adam Lanza found out about his mother 
“petitioning the court for conservatorship and (her) plans to have him committed,” and that “[a] senior 
law enforcement official involved in the [Sandy Hook] investigation confirmed that Lanza’s anger at 
his mother over plans for ‘his future mental health treatment’ [was] being looked at as a possible 
motive”).   
73 Ashley Halsey III & Peter Hermann, Day of Deaths and Dread in the Nation’s Capital, BOS. 
GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2013, at A1. 
74 Erica Goode et al., Signs of Distress Multiplied on Killer’s Path to Navy Yard, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 2013, at A1; see also Brigid Schulte et al., Chances to Intervene in Navy Yard Shooter’s 
Problems Missed for Years by Various Groups, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2013, at A1 (describing law 
enforcement accounts from Veterans Administration sources concerning Alexis’s treatment). 
75 Mark Townsend, Breivik Verdict: Norwegian Extremist Declared Sane 
and Sentenced to 21 Years, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
aug/24/breivik-verdict-sane-21-years.  Breivik was found legally sane at trial, although determined to 
be schizophrenic by court-appointed psychiatrists. 
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portion.  Over the past thirty years, “incidents in which four or more 
people were killed at random by a gunman killing indiscriminately” make 
up “less than a tenth of 1 percent” of all murders.76  Only one aspect of the 
mass murders renders them disproportionately important to public policy 
making: the question of foreseeability.  Many murderers have some 
relationship to the victim.  Of situations where the relationship between 
victim and murderer is known, only twenty-one percent of victims are 
strangers to their murderer.77  This allows members of the general public to 
believe, with some cause, that it is possible to avoid being a victim by 
picking one’s friends with care or by avoiding “bad” neighborhoods. 
Mass murders, defined as killings with multiple victims in a single 
place or across multiple locations during a brief period of time, often 
involve attacks on complete strangers by severely mentally ill killers.78  
The locations of these mass murders are not normally considered high-risk 
locations, as they include shopping malls, schools, and churches.  The 
popular perception that you cannot avoid these tragedies creates a level of 
fear disproportionate to the actual risk, sometimes provoking panicked 
legislative actions. 
III.  A HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS-RELATED FIREARMS REGULATION 
Surprisingly enough, attempts to regulate firearms possession by the 
mentally ill (except within the bounds of a mental hospital) appear to be 
quite recent.  George L. Harrison’s Legislation On Insanity provides a 
comprehensive collection of nineteenth-century laws concerning the 
commitment, operation, and funding of state and territorial mental 
hospitals.79  The words arms, firearms, weapon, pistol, revolver, handgun, 
rifle, and shotgun appear nowhere within its 1119 pages.  Similarly, Henry 
F. Buswell’s The Law of Insanity in Its Application to the Civil Rights and 
Capacities and Criminal Responsibility of the Citizen, a comprehensive 
work on the law of insanity from the same period, contains no discussion 
of regulation of arms by those who had been found mentally incompetent 
by the courts.80 
                                                                                                                          
76 Annie Linskey, Mass Shootings Fuel Fear, Account for Fraction of Murders, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-17/mass-shootings-fuel-fear-account-for-
fraction-of-murders.html. 
77 See Crime in the United States 2011: Expanded Homicide Data Table 10,                                   
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-10 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (indicating that of 
the 12,664 total murder victims in 2011, 5558 had an unknown relationship with their murderer and 
1481 were strangers to their murderer). 
78 DAVID LESTER, MASS MURDER: THE SCOURGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (2004). 
79 GEORGE L. HARRISON, LEGISLATION ON INSANITY: A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LUNACY LAWS 
OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila., Globe 1884). 
80 HENRY F. BUSWELL, THE LAW OF INSANITY IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
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The earliest state law on the subject that I could find is a 1957 
California statute prohibiting any “mental patient in any hospital or 
institution or on parole from any hospital or institution” from possessing a 
firearm.81  Other restrictive state laws appeared in the 1960s, such as New 
Jersey in 196682 and Illinois in 1967;83 news accounts suggest that 
previously there were only local ordinances in effect, and the state laws 
appear to be the first of their kind.84  Some of these early laws, such as 
South Carolina’s 1965 statute, relied on sellers to determine whether the 
buyer was “mentally competent.”85  This would be a difficult task for a 
person not trained in medicine or psychiatry to perform while completing a 
transaction that otherwise might take only a few minutes.  One must 
assume that only the most obvious cases of psychosis and senility would be 
noticed and rejected by a seller.  
Appearing earlier than any of the state laws is the District of 
Columbia’s 1932 Dangerous Weapons Act, which for the first time in 
many decades prohibited open carry of a firearm without a license.86  This 
law prohibited sales to anyone whom the seller “ha[d] reasonable cause to 
believe is not of sound mind.”87  The law seems functionally defective 
because there was nothing in the statute that prohibited those “not of sound 
mind” from possessing a firearm that was acquired outside of the District 
or obtained within the District by means other than a purchase.88   
                                                                                                                          
CAPACITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CITIZEN (Bos., Little Brown 1885). 
81 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5670 (1957) (current version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100 
(West 2013)). 
82 See 1966 N.J. Laws 484 (making a firearms seller guilty of a misdemeanor “where the seller 
has reason to believe the person is of unsound mind”).  
83 See 1967 Ill. Laws 2599–600 (“A person commits the offense of unlawful sale of firearms 
when he knowingly . . . [s]ells or gives any firearm to any person who has been a patient in a mental 
hospital within the past 5 years . . . .”). 
84 See Katzenbach Lauds N.J. Gun Bill, SUNDAY TIMES ADVERTISER (Trenton, N.J.), June 5, 
1966, at 1, 7 (reporting that New Jersey’s “pioneering law” was the “nation’s most comprehensive gun 
control”); Stop, Frisk Bill Vetoed by Kerner, ROCKFORD REG.-REPUBLIC (Rockford, Ill.), Aug. 4, 1967, 
at B1 (quoting Illinois’s governor as saying its new law was a “strong beginning”); see also Gun 
Control Campaign Meets Ardent Foes, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 23, 1968, at 11A (reporting 
that on April 15, 1968, Chicago adopted a slightly more restrictive firearm registration law than Illinois 
that prohibited ownership by “the mentally ill”).  
85 S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-578 (1965); see also Marc Anderson, State’s Gun Law Called Worthless, 
AUGUSTA CHRON. (Augusta, Ga.), Dec. 1, 1967, at 1 (stating, with respect to a state law, “We cannot 
hope for a pawn shop owner to judge whether a man who buys a gun is mentally competent or a 
felon”). 
86 D.C. CODE § 116d (Supp. V 1939).  Cooke v. United States explains the legislative history of 
this section’s predecessors.  275 F.2d 887, 889 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960).  In 1871, a law in the District 
prohibited the carrying of deadly weapons.  Id.  “The statute was amended after the turn of the century 
to make it unlawful to conceal a gun about one’s person or to carry it openly with the intent to use it 
unlawfully.”  Id.  (emphasis added). 
87 D.C. CODE § 116g. 
88 It is an interesting question whether this measure passed entirely or even primarily for the 
purpose of crime control.  Its date of passage, July 8, 1932, is twenty days before District police started 
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While we can assume that the police would have used existing records 
to determine whether a person might be “not of sound mind,” there seems 
to be no statutory definition of this term.  Would it require involuntary 
commitment to a mental hospital, a diagnosis of dementia, or something 
else?  A search of D.C. Circuit cases in the period between 1930 and 1940 
for the term “sound mind” is more mysterious than informative, and 
largely yields decisions relating to trusts and estates law.89  The closest that 
these decisions come to a useful definition is tautological: “laymen may 
testify to sanity or insanity, since ‘the appearance and conduct of insane 
persons, as contrasted with the appearance and conduct of persons of sound 
mind, are more or less understood and recognized by every one of ordinary 
intelligence.’”90 
Of course, pistol-licensing measures, such as New York’s Sullivan 
Law of 1911, likely had the effect of disarming the severely mentally ill 
because they provided unlimited discretion to a judge as to whether to 
allow an individual to possess a handgun.91  A few accidental peeks inside 
the results of the Sullivan Law process in the 1920s and 1950s suggest that 
there may have been political dimensions to the permit issuance process, at 
                                                                                                                          
eviction of the “Bonus Expeditionary Force,” a group of ten thousand veterans who “had ‘occupied’ the 
capital since early June” to pressure Congress to grant early payment of a bonus due to them for their 
World War I service.  HERBERT HOOVER AND WORLD PEACE 126 (Lee Nash ed., 2010).  Significantly, 
another law passed the same day as, and immediately following, the Dangerous Weapons Act, which 
provided for lending money to “any honorably discharged veteran of the World War, temporarily 
quartered in the District of Columbia” to return home, as long as they did so “prior to July 15, 1932.”  
H.R.J. Res. 462, 72nd Cong., 47 Stat. 654 (1932).  Perhaps this was all coincidence, but perhaps there 
was a desire to have a method to disarm or prosecute armed members of the Bonus Expeditionary 
Force. 
89 See, e.g., Ecker v. Potts, 112 F.2d 581, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (noting appellant’s argument that 
the testatrix was not of “sound mind”); McDonald v. Fulton Trust Co., 107 F.2d 237, 238 (D.C. Cir. 
1939) (noting the division of courts on the issue of whether a trust will be terminated “when some of its 
purposes are not yet fulfilled, but all the beneficiaries are of full age and sound mind”); Thompson v. 
Smith, 103 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (noting testimony that the decedent was “of sound mind”); 
Werner v. Frederick, 94 F.2d 627, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (noting the plaintiffs’ assertion that the 
decedent was not “of sound mind” at the time a will was executed); Owens v. United States, 85 F.2d 
270, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (noting that the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant to be of “sound 
mind”); Am. Sec. & Trust Co. v. ex rel. Spencer, 82 F.2d 456, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (quoting a portion 
of the decedent’s will where she stated she was “of sound mind”); Railey v. Railey, 30 F. Supp. 121, 
122 (D.D.C. 1939) (noting the defendant’s argument that the decedent was of “sound mind”). 
90 United States v. Witbeck, 113 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (quoting Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 619 (1884)). 
91 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 195, sec. 1, § 1897 (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01(1), 
265.20(a)(3) (McKinney 2013)).  A contributing factor to the passage of the Sullivan Law was the 
murder of David Graham Phillips, a socially and politically connected author, in New York City by 
Fitzhugh Coyle Goldsborough, a musician and poet suffering from mental illness.  Peter Duffy, 100 
Years Ago, the Shot That Spurred New York’s Gun-Control Law, CITY ROOM (Jan. 23, 2011), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/100-years-ago-the-shot-that-spurred-new-yorks-gun-
control-law/; see also Phillips Dies of His Wounds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1911, at A1 (announcing 
Phillips’s death). 
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least at the beginning.  Known Mafiosi were successfully receiving not just 
permits to possess pistols in their homes, but the much more difficult pistol 
carry permits.92  We can only hope that New York State judges have been 
more concerned about mentally ill persons with firearms than Mafiosi with 
firearms. 
Given the increased concern from the 1960s onward regarding the 
possession of firearms by the mentally ill, it is especially interesting to 
consider the relationship between violent crime and mental illness before 
that period of deinstitutionalization.  Certainly in the early days of the state 
mental hospital system, the potential for the mentally ill to commit crimes 
of violence was widely understood.  When Massachusetts opened 
Worcester Hospital in the early nineteenth century, the law limited its 
admissions to “the violent and furious.”93  Dr. Samuel B. Woodward, 
Worcester Hospital’s first superintendent, noted, “More than half of those 
manifesting monomania and melancholia are said to exhibit a propensity to 
homicide or suicide.”94  Accounts of mass murder—usually involving 
family members—appear often enough in this period to understand why 
insanity could lead to hospitalization.95  The opening of state asylums in 
                                                                                                                          
92 See JAY S. ALBANESE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN OUR TIMES 141–42 (2011) (reviewing the 1957 
Appalachian, New York, Mafia leadership meeting that police accidentally discovered); EDWARD 
BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 240–41 (1996) (stating that many of 
the Mafiosi had pistol carry permits issued by New York and New Jersey authorities); DAVID 
CRITCHLEY, THE ORIGIN OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA: THE NEW YORK CITY MAFIA, 1891–
1931, at 285 n.81 (2009) (describing how a New York mafia member used someone else’s address to 
obtain a pistol permit); SID FEDER & JOACHIM JOESTEN, THE LUCIANO STORY 52–54 (1954) (providing 
examples of 1920s Mafiosi receiving pistol carry permits); THOMAS A. REPPETTO, AMERICAN MAFIA: 
A HISTORY OF ITS RISE TO POWER 105 (2004) (noting that a New York mafia member was able to 
produce “a pistol permit signed by a state supreme court justice” when stopped by the police). 
93 HERBERT GOLDHAMER & ANDREW W. MARSHALL, PSYCHOSIS AND CIVILIZATION: TWO 
STUDIES IN THE FREQUENCY OF MENTAL DISEASE 39 (1953). 
94 Id. at 40–41.  In modern terminology, the disorders mentioned are the rough equivalents of 
schizophrenia and depression, respectively.  The term “monomania” was used for a variety of 
psychiatric conditions in the nineteenth century, leading to criticisms that it should perhaps be 
narrowed in its meaning.  See R.L. Parsons, Nomenclature of Psychiatry, 56 MED. & SURGICAL REP. 
718 (1887) (“Monomania had been employed to indicate many different conditions of mental 
disease . . . . [at least one doctor] had come to use the term paranoia as a substitute for that of 
monomania with satisfaction . . . .”). 
95 See, e.g., JAMES W. NORTH, THE HISTORY OF AUGUSTA, FROM THE EARLIEST SETTLEMENT TO 
THE PRESENT TIME 335–37 (1870) (providing detailed accounts of the 1806 Purrinton murders, in 
which James Purrinton used a knife to murder his wife and seven of his eight children before 
committing suicide); LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, A MIDWIFE’S TALE: THE LIFE OF MARTHA 
BALLARD, BASED ON HER DIARY, 1785–1812, at 291–306 (1991) (same).  The case of William Beadle, 
of Wethersfield, Connecticut, is disturbingly similar.  ROYAL RALPH HINMAN, A CATALOGUE OF THE 
NAMES OF THE EARLY PURITAN SETTLERS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 165–67 (1852).  In 1782, 
Beadle murdered his wife and four children by knocking them unconscious with an ax, then slitting 
their throats.  Id. at 166.  He then killed himself by firing two pistols at his head, simultaneously.  Id.  
Beadle’s alleged motive was to protect them from ensuing poverty, his capital having been destroyed 
by the Revolution.  GEORGE SIMON ROBERTS, HISTORIC TOWNS OF THE CONNECTICUT RIVER VALLEY 
153–55 (1906). 
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Vermont in 1836 and New Hampshire in 1840 “contributed to the decline 
in such spouse and family murders during the 1850s and 1860s.”96  
During the period before deinstitutionalization, the mentally ill seem to 
have been less likely to be arrested for crimes than the general population.  
Studies in New York and Connecticut from the 1920s through the 1940s 
showed a much lower arrest rate for the mentally ill.97  This is no surprise; 
those who were severely mentally ill were much more likely to be 
hospitalized before they became dangerously violent.98 
IV.  CURRENT MENTAL ILLNESS-RELATED FIREARMS REGULATION 
A.  The Federal Regulatory Scheme 
The Gun Control Act of 196899 makes firearms possession unlawful 
for anyone “adjudicated as a mental defective” or who has been 
“committed to a mental institution.”100  Federal regulation further defines 
these terms: 
Adjudicated as a mental defective.  (a) A determination by a 
court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a 
person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or 
mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: 
    (1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or 
    (2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his 
own affairs. 
(b) The term shall include— 
    (1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and 
    (2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or 
found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility 
pursuant to articles 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 850a, 876b. 
. . . . 
                                                                                                                          
96 Randolph A. Roth, Spousal Murder in Northern New England, 1776–1865, in OVER THE 
THRESHOLD: INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN EARLY AMERICA 65, 72 (Christine Daniels & Michael V. 
Kennedy eds., 1999).  
97 PHIL BROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE: PSYCHIATRIC DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 133 (1985); cf. Thomas M. Arvanites, The Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems: 
Complementary Forms of Coercive Control, in SOCIAL THREAT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 131, 139 (Allen 
A. Liska ed., 1992) (“[E]vidence that suggests that the mentally ill are being arrested more often since 
deinstitutionalization.”). 
98 BROWN, supra note 97, at 140. 
99 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–28 (2012). 
100 Id. § 922. 
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Committed to a mental institution.  A formal commitment of 
a person to a mental institution by a court, board, 
commission, or other lawful authority.  The term includes a 
commitment to a mental institution involuntarily.  The term 
includes commitment for mental defectiveness or mental 
illness.  It also includes commitments for other reasons, such 
as for drug use.  The term does not include a person in a 
mental institution for observation or a voluntary admission to 
a mental institution.101 
Federally licensed firearms dealers must use the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) to perform background 
checks on prospective firearm purchasers.102  The NICS Improvement 
Amendments Act of 2007 requires states to contribute criminal records and 
records of certain mental health-related adjudications or commitments to 
NICS as a condition to receiving federal funds.103  The Act also requires 
states to provide relief from disability-derived firearms restrictions through 
“a State court, board, commission, or other lawful authority” if “the 
person’s record and reputation[] are such that the person will not be likely 
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the 
relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”104  Similar provisions 
apply to federal departments or agencies that make mental health-related 
adjudications or commitments.105 
Assuming its constitutionality, federal law concerning mental illness 
and firearms possession is, of course, supreme and—if vigorously 
enforced—would render state laws on the subject moot.  But federal law, 
while supreme in its authority, is necessarily limited in its practical 
enforcement.  Except in fairly limited circumstances (e.g., an attempt to 
purchase a firearm from a licensed dealer), a person disqualified by federal 
law from firearms possession is unlikely to be arrested or prosecuted.  
Most prosecutions take place under state law because state and local police 
provide most criminal law enforcement within the United States. 
B.  State Regulation and NICS Reporting 
One 2007 survey found that four states had no laws prohibiting 
firearms possession by the mentally ill; twelve states prohibited the 
mentally ill from obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon only; and 
                                                                                                                          
101 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2013). 
102 18 U.S.C. § 922(t); see also National Instant Criminal Background Check System, FED. 
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Apr. 30, 2014) (describing 
the functions of NICS). 
103 Pub. L. No. 110-180, §§ 102–103, 121 Stat. 2559, 2564–68. 
104 Id. § 105, 121 Stat. at 2569–70. 
105 Id. § 101(c)(2)(A). 
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the remaining thirty-four states (plus the District of Columbia) prohibited, 
in varying degrees or for varying periods, the mentally ill from possessing 
firearms.106  In some jurisdictions, this is a prohibition on handguns, but in 
others, it is a prohibition on any category of firearm.107   
That sixteen states allow the severely mentally ill to purchase, receive, 
or possess firearms is alarming, but this actually understates the severity of 
the problem.  Even states that have mental illness firearms-disability laws 
often do not supply this disqualifying information to NICS.  As of April 
30, 2007, NICS had received 138,766 “disqualifying mental health 
records” from the Veterans Administration, one record from the 
Department of Defense, and 167,903 records from twenty-two of the fifty 
states.108  The other twenty-eight states had submitted no mental illness 
disqualifier records at all.  Of the 167,903 records that were submitted, 
ninety-two percent were from Michigan and Virginia.109  The most 
populous state, California, had submitted a total of twenty-seven records.110   
Further complicating this severe problem, states have the discretion to 
submit records under the “denied persons file” instead of the “mental 
defective file,” if, for example, there are concerns regarding patient 
privacy.111  This option allows states to disqualify a person without 
specifying a reason or turning over mental health records to NICS.112  It 
should therefore be no surprise that NICS rejects an astonishingly low 
number of firearms purchases for mental illness.  In 2010, NICS received 
approximately 10.4 million firearms transfer applications, of which 
152,850 were rejected.113  Only 5879 applications were rejected 
                                                                                                                          
106 Joseph R. Simpson, Bad Risk?: An Overview of Laws Prohibiting Possession of Firearms by 
Individuals with a History of Treatment for Mental Illness, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 330, 
333 (2007).   
107 Id. 
108 Lethal Loopholes; Deficiencies in State and Federal Gun Purchase Laws: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 
138 (2007) [hereinafter Lethal Loopholes Hearing] (statement of Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen. 
for Legal Policy, Department of Justice).   
109 Id. 
110 Id.  The Department of Veterans Affairs submits mental disqualification records when it has 
assigned a fiduciary to manage an individual’s financial affairs because he “lacks the mental capacity to 
manage his or her own financial affairs regarding disbursement of funds without limitation, and is 
either rated incompetent by VA or adjudged to be under legal disability by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.”  EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43040, SUBMISSION OF MENTAL 
HEALTH RECORDS TO NICS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43040.pdf.  As might be expected, there is some dispute as to 
whether all such cases are appropriately reported to NICS; the Social Security Administration has no 
similar rule for when a fiduciary manages financial benefits.  Id. at 3. 
111 Lethal Loopholes Hearing, supra note 108, at 11. 
112 Id. 
113 RONALD J. FRANDSEN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 238226, BACKGROUND 
CHECKS FOR FIREARMS TRANSFERS, 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 4 tbl.2 (2013).  Of the 2010 
rejections, 36,672 (24%) were appealed, and 12,275 (33.5%) of the appeals were reversed.  Id. at 7 
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specifically due to mental illness or disability.114  Because the “denied 
persons file” provides a way for states to disqualify a person without 
mentioning mental illness, at least some of the 20,667 rejections for “other 
prohibitions” might be attributable to such conditions.115  
A few states perform their own background checks, using the state’s 
own records as well as the resources of NICS, but do not necessarily 
submit mental health disqualifying records to NICS.116  One consequence 
is that a state may successfully block a mentally ill person from buying a 
firearm in that state, but the person may take up residence in another state 
and not be blocked from purchasing firearms.117  The new state of 
residence does not have access to the previous state’s mental illness 
records, nor does NICS.118  One example where submitting records to 
NICS made a real difference is that of Virginia, which started submitting 
mental health disqualifier records in November 2003.119  Three years later, 
Virginia’s records had prevented not only sixty purchase attempts in that 
same state, but also 378 purchase attempts in other states.120   
C.  Changing State Regulations and NICS Reporting Practices in the Wake 
of Recent Tragedies 
For those wondering if or how the Virginia Tech massacre fits into 
Virginia’s 2003 change in procedure, it does not.  The killer, Seung-Hui 
Cho, was not involuntarily committed to a hospital, despite concerns by the 
special judge who presided over the hearing that Cho was an imminent 
threat to himself and others.121  Cho was ordered, however, to engage in 
outpatient treatment.122  Because of differences in how federal and Virginia 
law define firearms disability with respect to mental illness, Cho’s 
purchases were in violation of federal law but not clearly in violation of 
Virginia law.123  The ambiguity of whether court-ordered outpatient 
treatment qualified as “involuntary commitment” under Virginia law 
                                                                                                                          
tbl.6. 
114 See id. at 6 tbl.4  (reflecting the combined figure of 1.8% of 72,659 FBI rejections and 5.7% of 
80,191 state and local agency rejections).  
115 See id. (reflecting the combined figure of 0.3% of 72,659 FBI rejections and 25.5% of 80,191 
state and local agency rejections). 
116 Background Checks for Guns: What You Need to Know, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/10/17689167-background-checks-for-guns-what-you-need-
to-know?lite. 
117 Lethal Loopholes Hearing, supra note 108, at 139. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 48, 56 (2007), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/documents/vatechreport.pdf. 
122 Id. at 48. 
123 Id. at 71–72. 
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would appear to be why Cho’s handgun purchases were allowed by the 
background check and not reported to NICS.  Note that this ambiguity was 
corrected by an executive order from Governor Kaine in the days 
following the murders.124 
Improved reporting of mental-health disqualifiers to NICS would 
reduce firearms purchases by those prohibited by federal law.  In response 
to recent tragedies, federal financial assistance, and encouragement from 
the Department of Justice,125 there has been a dramatic increase in the 
number of states that now submit mental incompetence records to NICS or 
are preparing to do so.   
In New Jersey, the roadblock to submission appears to have been the 
courts.  The New Jersey courts recently announced that they had submitted 
“nearly 413,000 records to the New Jersey State Police to forward to 
federal authorities” for addition to NICS.126  At least part of what made this 
possible was a revision to state law “clarifying that disclosure of mental 
health records does not violate privacy laws.”127  But along with these 
413,000 records of involuntary commitments, “[i]nformation about 
thousands of individuals who voluntarily seek admission to mental health 
treatment facilities also will be submitted for inclusion on the NICS using 
the existing infrastructure at no additional cost,”128 even though the federal 
definition specifically excludes voluntary commitments from the federal 
disability.129  This inclusion of voluntary commitments creates a serious 
due process problem, because these voluntary commitments are 
indistinguishable from the involuntary commitments when NICS must 
decide whether to reject a firearm purchase. 
Unsurprisingly, after the Newtown tragedy, Connecticut “is creating a 
database of individuals who are disqualified from owning a gun for mental 
health reasons.”130  Unlike New Jersey, news coverage indicates that the 
state is conforming to the federal requirements by only including those 
who have been involuntarily committed and those “who have been found 
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty due to insanity.”131  State officials 
                                                                                                                          
124 Id. at 72–73. 
125 See Lethal Loopholes Hearing, supra note 108, at 137–38 (explaining federal “outreach 
efforts” to encourage increased state reporting). 
126 David Levinsky, 413,000 NJ Mental Health Records Submitted for Gun Checks, BURLINGTON 
CNTY. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.burlingtoncountytimes.com/news/local/burlington_county_t
imes_news/nj-mental-health-records-submitted-for-gun-checks/article_2b01c264-3fd8-5b03-8c77-
1482d55ed2a3.html. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2013) (“The term [commitment] does not include a person in a mental 
institution for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.”). 
130 Jenny Wilson, Banned List for Owning Guns; State Creating Database for Better Reporting; 
Mental Health, HARTFORD COURANT, May 8, 2013, at A1. 
131 Id. 
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report that they have already found disqualifying records not previously 
submitted to NICS.132 
Pennsylvania also submitted more than 600,000 disqualifying mental 
health records to NICS in January 2013—records not previously provided 
by the state police.133  Complicating this decision is that about seventy to 
seventy-five percent of those records were “302 Commitments.”134  The 
302 Commitment is “the shortest and most common type of involuntary 
mental health commitment.”135  Recently, the ATF acknowledged that it is 
“reviewing whether Pennsylvania’s 302 commitment is a federal 
prohibition under federal law.”136  The emergency nature of a 302 
Commitment is posited on concern that the subject is an imminent threat to 
self or others, and the short-term nature of the commitment (120 hours)137 
limits the damage that such a commitment does to a subject’s rights.  It 
seems like a reasonable balancing of the individual’s rights and the state’s 
desire to protect both others and the subject of the commitment.  However, 
the submission of a 302 Commitment to NICS, which deprives an 
individual of the right to keep and bear arms for years in the future, is 
neither emergency in nature (because it will take days for that information 
to become operative in the NICS database), nor temporary in its 
consequences (because it will deprive an individual of the right to bear 
arms for years).  It seems unlikely that a long-term commitment or 
deprivation of fundamental rights would be so readily tolerated by the 
federal courts without a more formal procedure.  
Maine amended its state law in 2008 to clarify that allowing state 
agencies to “releas[e] information about involuntarily committed 
individuals” did not violate the privacy rights of patients.138  Maine has 
since wanted to submit mental health disqualifiers to NICS, but a lack of 
resources has prevented court officials from processing approximately 
5000 records to find out how many qualify as involuntary commitments.139 
                                                                                                                          
132 Id. 
133 Moriah Balingit, Pa. Sends Mental Health Data for Gun Checks, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
Jan. 19, 2013, at A1. 
134 Id.; see also 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (West 2014) (allowing for involuntary 
commitment for up to 120 hours of observation based on a doctor’s belief that a patient “is severely 
mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment”).  Pennsylvania’s 302 Commitment statute does 
not provide individuals with any advance notice or opportunity for a hearing, but the Third Circuit has 
held that the statute satisfies procedural due process requirements in light of the “emergency situation” 
and “short-term commitment.”  Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004). 
135 Balingit, supra note 133. 
136 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
137 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(d).  
138 Robert Long, How Does Maine Balance Public Safety and Gun Rights of Mentally 
Ill?,BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/01/18/politics/how-does-
maine-balance-public-safety-and-gun-rights-of-mentally-ill/. 
139 Id.  
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In the aftermath of the Newtown tragedy, Governor Deval Patrick of 
Massachusetts sought legislative approval to submit mental health 
disqualifier records from public psychiatric facilities to NICS.140  Mental 
health advocacy organizations, such as the National Alliance on Mental 
Illness of Massachusetts, opposed the bill, because “[a]n all-encompassing 
database reinforces stigma and labels, and creates fear.”141  This may be 
very true, but as discussed in Part I of this Article, that fear has a very real 
factual basis.142  Other opponents of the Massachusetts proposal 
misunderstood that such records were only for involuntary commitments, 
and not for outpatient or voluntary inpatient treatment.  For example, 
Professor James Alan Fox stated that “banning gun possession for people 
who go to psychiatrists ‘would only discourage people from getting 
treatment.’”143 
The Newtown tragedy has certainly given strong impetus to states to 
submit involuntary commitment and other mental illness disqualifying 
records to NICS.  Some are doing what the law requires and carefully 
separating voluntary from involuntary commitments.  Other states are 
opening up a can of worms by failing to make that distinction.  This both 
violates the rights of persons who voluntarily enter a mental hospital for 
treatment and may discourage persons who are severely depressed, but are 
reluctant to risk the loss of firearms rights. 
V.  DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND FIREARMS REGULATION  
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 
A.  The Societal Momentum for Deinstitutionalization 
 It may seem a bit startling that regulation of firearms possession by the 
mentally ill has only occurred in relatively recent times, until we examine 
the history of how American society has handled the problem of mental 
illness.  Until the 1960s, individuals with severe mental illness problems 
were hospitalized fairly readily, sometimes for periods of months, and then 
released, sometimes forever, depending on how well they responded to 
treatment.144  Under the best of conditions, state mental hospitals were not 
good environments for the mentally ill.  But today, we have switched to 
even worse alternatives: life on the street for many; death from exposure 
                                                                                                                          
140 Lee Hammel, Mental Health Factor in Trying to Reduce Mass Killings, WORCESTER 
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 2013, at A1. 
141 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
142 See supra Part I (discussing the correlation between mental health and violence). 
143 Hammel, supra note 140. 
144 See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, MY BROTHER RON: A PERSONAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL 77 (2012) (“There were patients who entered public 
mental hospitals, and stayed there for life . . . . [M]any others . . . were released within a year.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 1326 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1301 
and disease for some; jail or prison for others; and tragic headlines for a 
few who become national news stories.145 
The desire for a more humane approach led to deinstitutionalization of 
the mentally ill in the 1960s and the 1970s.  In the period immediately after 
World War II, state mental hospitals were often dreadful, barbarous places, 
at least in part because of funding problems caused by the Great 
Depression and World War II.146  State mental hospitals also cared for the 
senile elderly and syphilitic insane, creating severe crowding in what were 
often unpleasant custodial institutions.147  Until the introduction in 1954 of 
the first antipsychotic medication, chlorpromazine, the first choices for 
managing a patient who posed a danger to self or others were a straitjacket, 
electroconvulsive therapy (“shock treatment”), or a prefrontal lobotomy.148   
A perfect storm of public policy emerged in the period between the 
end of World War II and 1980, as multiple movements collided to produce 
the deinstitutionalization movement, which nearly became the antithesis of 
humane treatment of the mentally ill.149  Good intentions were not in short 
supply, but good intentions were not enough.  The emerging psychiatry 
movement dominated the profession and the National Institute of Mental 
Health was formed.150  Through these institutions, psychiatry promoted a 
model that had worked well with soldiers suffering from combat fatigue, 
but was completely inappropriate for the civilian psychotic population.151 
B.  The Changed Legal Standards Relating to Deinstitutionalization 
Other movements rapidly collided, ultimately with disastrous results.  
The emerging counterculture distrusted authority and middle-class values, 
and soon had its partisans in the establishment.152  Civil libertarians 
insisted on a very strict standard of due process that was substantially at 
odds with the American tradition of civil commitment law.153  In Lessard v. 
Schmidt,154 a federal district court struck down Wisconsin’s involuntary 
commitment statute for two reasons.155  First, it failed to provide the patient 
with sufficient notice of her proceedings and an opportunity to have a 
lawyer represent her interests.156  Second, and perhaps more importantly, it 
                                                                                                                          
145 Id. at 51. 
146 Id. at 76. 
147 Id. at 77. 
148 Id. at 48–49, 55. 
149 Id. at 51, 57. 
150 Id. at 54. 
151 Id. at 51. 
152 Id. at 66–75. 
153 Id. at 105–23. 
154 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).  
155 Id. at 1103. 
156 Id. at 1093, 1099. 
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rejected the traditional parens patriae role of government to watch over the 
interests of the patient157 and required that the government prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a person was “mentally ill and dangerous.”158   
Backing away from Lessard’s use of the standard of proof for criminal 
convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas159 replaced the 
traditional preponderance of evidence standard for involuntary 
commitment with a requirement for “clear and convincing evidence” of 
mental illness.160  The Court reasoned that involuntary commitment 
involved both the deprivation of liberty and the stigma associated with 
mental illness.161  In Vitek v. Jones,162 the Court ruled that due process 
requirements must even be satisfied before a convicted felon is transferred 
from a prison to a mental hospital.163  The prisoner in the case was still 
within his original sentence, yet the Court explained that “involuntary 
commitment [would be] more than a loss of freedom from confinement” 
for him because it subjects individuals to involuntary psychiatric treatment 
and stigmatization.164 
At the same time, some commentators insisted that the state had a duty 
to provide treatment as a condition of holding certain mental health 
patients.165  In some cases, the goal was openly stated: the threat to release 
mental patients would force legislatures to spend the requisite money to 
provide treatment, instead of simply warehousing the mentally ill.166  
                                                                                                                          
157 See id. at 1085 (explaining that the “American innovation [of parens patriae] resulted in total, 
and perhaps permanent, loss of liberty”). 
158 See id. at 1095 (“The argument for a stringent standard of proof is more compelling in the case 
of a civil commitment in which an individual will be deprived of basic civil rights and be certainly 
stigmatized by the lack of confidentiality of the adjudication. We therefore hold that the state must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to show that an individual is mentally ill and 
dangerous.”). 
159 441 U.S. 418 (1979).  
160 Id. at 427.  
161 Id. at 429. 
162 445 U.S. 480 (1980).  
163 Id. at 493–94.  
164 Id. at 492, 494. 
165 See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Right to Treatment: The Court’s Role, 20 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129–30 (1969) (defending his decision in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 
(D.C. Cir. 1966), which found that a person who is involuntarily committed following acquittal of a 
crime by reason of insanity must either be treated within a reasonable amount of time or released).  
More recently, the Supreme Court recognized that the lone penological goal of incapacitation could be 
appropriate in some situations, for “it would be of little value to require treatment as a precondition for 
civil confinement of the dangerously insane when no acceptable treatment existed.”  Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997). 
166 See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499, 502–03 (1960) (arguing for 
“the recognition and enforcement of the legal right of a mentally ill inmate of a public mental 
institution to adequate medical treatment for his mental illness”).  Birnbaum’s argument for such a right 
to treatment was not based on any recognizable constitutional provision, but simply that if this “right to 
treatment were to be recognized and enforced, it [would] be shown that the standard of treatment in 
public mental institutions probably [would] be raised.”  Id. at 499.  
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Whatever the pragmatic arguments for this might be, it represented a 
dramatic change in the American legal tradition.  In O’Connor v. 
Donaldson,167 the Court held that “[a] finding of ‘mental illness’ alone” 
does not justify holding a mental patient against his will and that release is 
required if the patient is “dangerous to no one and can live safely in 
freedom.”168  While the Court did not reach the specific question of 
whether the state must provide treatment during involuntary 
commitments,169 Chief Justice Burger reflected on the developing 
movement in that area in his concurrence: 
[T]he idea that States may not confine the mentally ill except 
for the purpose of providing them with treatment is of very 
recent origin, and there is no historical basis for imposing 
such a limitation on state power . . . . It may be that some 
persons [who do not acknowledge their illness or cooperate 
with treatment] . . . are unable to function in society and will 
suffer real harm to themselves unless provided with care in a 
sheltered environment.170 
Civil libertarians also furthered a campaign insisting that patients have 
a right to refuse treatment.171  Among the more astonishing decisions 
embracing this rationale comes from the Massachusetts Supreme Court.172  
Against the advice of a psychiatrist, a schizophrenic minor with a history 
of criminal behavior refused antipsychotic medication at a state hospital.173  
The minor’s father sought contingent authority to authorize this treatment 
out of concern for the well-being of his son.174  Under the circumstances, 
the court found that the approach to treatment would require a “substituted 
judgment determination.”175  This determination involves a court 
substituting its judgment for what the minor might have decided to do had 
                                                                                                                          
167 422 U.S. 563 (1975).  
168 Id. at 575. 
169 Id. at 573. 
170 Id. at 582–84. 
171 E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Op-Ed, Why Do Severely Mentally Ill Go Untreated?, 
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1998, at A11.  It is worth noting that in prison settings, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized that the state can “treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with 
antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is 
in the inmate’s medical interest.”  Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). 
172 See In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Mass. 1981) (holding that state hospital 
psychiatrists and the father of a mentally ill minor did not have authority to overrule the minor’s 
decision to refuse antipsychotic medication).   
173 Id. at 44. 
174 Id. at 50. 
175 Id. 
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he been sane.176  But what would the minor have decided if he were sane?  
As the same court explained in a later decision, “The likelihood of 
improvement or cure enhances the likelihood that an incompetent patient 
would accept treatment, but it is not conclusive.”177  A mentally 
incompetent person, if he had been sane, might decide that sanity is 
preferable to insanity, but this is by no means certain.178  As a result, states 
that had at least an obligation to provide care for the severely mentally ill, 
if they were held involuntarily, could face competing pressures to provide 
no care at all. 
In addition, some of the lawsuits initiated against deplorable state 
mental hospitals dramatically increased their operating costs, and further 
encouraged states to deinstitutionalize.  For example, in Wyatt v. 
Stickney179 a federal district court ruled, not too surprisingly, that patients 
enjoy a constitutional right to send sealed mail.180  But the court also 
decided that there was a constitutional right to a specific number of clerical 
support staff per patient.181  The net effect of Wyatt was to both 
micromanage local mental hospitals and dramatically increase their 
operating costs. 
C.   The Deinstitutionalization Transition: From State Mental Hospitals to 
Streets and Prisons 
Soon, state mental hospitals were emptied of many of their patients—
from 559,000 in 1955 to 110,000 in 1990182—during a period when the 
U.S. population rose by fifty percent.183  To be fair, some of this dramatic 
reduction was because of Medicare’s willingness to pay private nursing 
homes to care for the elderly senile, but not to reimburse state mental 
hospitals for it.184  This created an economic incentive for states to move a 
large portion of their patients to private nursing care (where death rates 
                                                                                                                          
176 Id.  The court noted that its decision was confined to non-emergency situations and that an 
individual’s right to refuse treatment could be overridden if necessary to prevent harm to the patient or 
others.  Id. at 59. 
177 Rogers v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 319 (Mass. 1983). 
178 Id.  
179 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
180 Id. at 379. 
181 Id. at 383. 
182 David Mechanic & David A. Rochefort, Deinstitutionalization: An Appraisal of Reform, 16 
ANN. REV. SOC. 301, 301 (1990). 
183 Historical National Population Estimates:  July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt (last updated June 28, 
2000). 
184 MICHAEL J. DEAR & JENNIFER R. WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR: FROM 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO HOMELESSNESS 65–66, 140–42 (1987); Margaret W. Linn & Shayna 
Stein, Nursing Homes as Community Mental Health Facilities, in HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH 
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 267, 270–71 (David A. Rochefort ed., 1989). 
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were higher, perhaps because of aggressive cost-cutting by these profit-
making institutions).185  The introduction of antibiotics for the treatment of 
syphilis after World War II also gradually eliminated the syphilitic insane, 
who had accounted for between six and twenty-two percent of mental 
hospital patients during the twentieth century.186   
While California was a leader in the deinstitutionalization of the 
mentally ill, its experience was not completely unusual.  California saw a 
67% decline in non-elderly state mental hospital patients between 1955 and 
1977, as deinstitutionalization increasingly returned the mentally ill to 
community-based mental health treatment facilities.187  In practice, because 
so many of the severely mentally ill refused to accept treatment in a 
voluntary setting, deinstitutionalization returned them not so much to the 
community, as to park benches, the lobbies of public buildings, and 
alleys.188  One recent critic of the growing incarceration rate for the 
mentally ill argued that it could be remedied by addressing four key 
problems: (1) homelessness; (2) the frequent failure to reapply for 
Medicaid benefits following prison release; (3) substance abuse disorders; 
and (4) stigmatization.189  While these factors may certainly contribute to 
the mentally ill’s failure to receive proper treatment, the most basic 
problem of all should not be discounted: refusal by the severely mentally 
ill to recognize that they are in need of treatment. 
As millions of unsupervised and untreated mental patients returned to 
the streets, there was little in the way of either theoretical or practical 
regulation of firearms access by the mentally ill.  Sometimes, Social 
Security disability checks went to persons with hallucinations and 
delusions.190  For example, it appears that Patrick Purdy’s Social Security 
disability checks paid for the weapons that he used for the first of the 
schoolyard massacres in 1989.191  The question is not why the period from 
1980 to the present has been awash in these random acts of mass murder, 
disproportionately committed by people with very serious mental illnesses.  
                                                                                                                          
185 See GERALD N. GROB, FROM ASYLUM TO COMMUNITY: MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN MODERN 
AMERICA 267–69 (1991) (demonstrating financial restrictions on state mental health hospitals); 
GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA’S MENTALLY ILL 266 
(1994) [hereinafter GROB, THE MAD AMONG US] (illustrating the patient shift to private nursing care). 
186 GROB, THE MAD AMONG US, supra note 185, at 124–25; MASS. STATE BD. OF INSANITY, 
FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF INSANITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 45 (1914). 
187 DEAR & WOLCH, supra note 184, at 65–66, 140–42. 
188 Id. 
189 Christina Canales, Note, Prisons: The New Mental Health System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1725, 
1727 (2012). 
190 See, e.g., Johnson v. Astrue, 493 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655, 657 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (defining 
hallucinations and delusions as impairments for the purposes of qualifying for Social Security disability 
income). 
191 Glen Morgan, The Assault Rifle Controversy, 3 J. POL. & SOC. 21, 24 (1991). 
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Arguably, the question should instead be: why have we as a society been 
so lucky?  Given these circumstances, the number of mass murders could 
potentially have been much higher. 
The answer is the advent of the incarceration revolution, which began 
in the late twentieth century and caused prison populations to 
“skyrocket[].”192  Many dangerous mentally ill individuals that may have 
been institutionalized in another era were imprisoned.  This prevented what 
might have been a far more serious murder problem, although at very 
substantial costs to mentally ill prisoners.  Harcourt’s work demonstrates 
that, while the mentally ill from the 1990s forward were not hospitalized 
much, they were still being incapacitated via jails and prisons193—which is 
why murder rates fell.   
VI.  DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION’S CONSEQUENCES 
A.  A Different View of the State 
The previous discussion alludes to many recent tragedies being the 
consequence of a well-intentioned effort to improve conditions for the 
mentally ill by emptying state mental hospitals.  Some of this was simply a 
consequence of legislative miscalculation and a failure to correct mistakes.  
But there was also a radical abrogation of the traditional duty of the state, 
which Chief Justice Burger described in his concurring opinion in 
O’Connor: “[T]he States are vested with the historic parens patriae power, 
including the duty to protect ‘persons under legal disabilities to act for 
themselves.’  The classic example of this role is when a State undertakes to 
act as ‘the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics.’”194   
Traditionally, state governments were assumed to be looking out for 
the best interests of the mentally ill, and thus the preponderance of 
evidence standard was considered sufficient for involuntary 
commitment.195  Civil libertarians zealously insisted, largely based on 
theoretical models that often denied that mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia even existed,196 that a much more demanding standard be 
                                                                                                                          
192 Harcourt, supra note 30, at 3. 
193 Harcourt, supra note 26, at 1773. 
194 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)). 
195 See, e.g., State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. 1977) (“In future cases of civil 
commitment the jury should be instructed that the burden is upon the State to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence the statutory prerequisites to commitment.”). 
196 See CRAMER, supra note 144, at 68–74, 111, 115 (reviewing arguments by Szasz and Laing 
concerning the non-existence of schizophrenia and explaining how lawyers advocating for stricter 
standards, as a matter of civil liberties, knew nothing about mental illness except for what they had read 
from Szasz); see also Alan Kerr, Interview: Thomas Szasz, 21 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 39, 41 (1997) 
(including Szasz’s proud description of how he completed his psychiatric residency without ever 
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used for involuntary commitment, preferably “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”197   
B.  Increased Homelessness and Associated Mortality Rates 
While this approach is superficially appealing, the intervening decades 
have demonstrated the negative consequences of deinstitutionalization for 
the mentally ill, and not just with respect to crime rates.  Homelessness in 
America was not even on the radar of the general public before 1980.  A 
plot of references to the word “homeless” in published works reveals a 
startling increase several years after deinstitutionalization was fully 
implemented in the late 1970s.198 
This is not simply an artifact of increased discussion; studies of the 
homeless from the 1980s through the present have found that the homeless 
are disproportionately mentally ill.199  Where attempts were made to 
determine causality, the mental illness was usually found to have preceded 
                                                                                                                          
having any contact with psychotic patients and how, after he was drafted into the Navy, he went 
through the motions of being a psychiatrist: “The servicemen didn’t want to be in the Navy and played 
the role of mental patient.  I didn’t want to be in the Navy and played the role of military psychiatrist: 
My job was to discharge the men from the Service as ‘neuropsychiatric casualties.’”). 
197 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 421 (1979) (indicating that the appellant had requested at 
trial that the court use “beyond a reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof for involuntary 
commitment). 
198 GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, https://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014) (search “homeless” between “1900” and “2000” from the corpus “English” with a smoothing of 
“3”). 
199 DEAR & WOLCH, supra note 184, at 175–76; see also Leena L. Bachrach, The Homeless 
Mentally Ill and Mental Health Services, in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF 
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 16–19 (H. Richard Lamb ed., 1984) (reporting that 40% of 
179 homeless men and women in a Philadelphia shelter were found to have “major mental disorders,” 
with one-third diagnosed as schizophrenic and one-fourth diagnosed as having substance abuse 
problems, and further that 40% of 78 Boston shelter residents had major mental disorders, 51% had less 
severe psychiatric problems, and the remaining 9% were largely dependent spouses and children); Irene 
Shifren Levine & Loretta K. Haggard, Homelessness as a Public Mental Health Problem, in 
HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 184, at 293, 294–99, 306 
(noting that the mentally ill are at a high risk of becoming homeless and that “[h]omelessness is in part 
a public mental health problem”); Pamela J. Fischer et al., Mental Health and Social Characteristics of 
the Homeless: A Survey of Mission Users, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 519, 521–22 (1986) (explaining that 
in one study 37% of homeless persons were diagnosed as suffering a mental disorder compared to 18% 
of household males, and that “[o]ne-third of the homeless had a previous psychiatric hospitalization 
compared to only 5 percent of male householders”); Shirley N. Harris et al., Physical Health, Mental 
Health, and Substance Abuse Problems of Shelter Users, 19 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 37 (1994) 
(summarizing a study of homeless shelter residents that found that only 26% had been previously 
hospitalized for psychiatric problems, although 4.8% of those requested to participate declined because 
their “psychiatric distress [was] too severe” and 29% declined for various reasons, including that they 
“did not want any records made on themselves”); Cheryl Zlotnick et al., Long-Term and Chronic 
Homelessness in Homeless Women and Women with Children, 25 SOC. WORK IN PUB. HEALTH 470, 
472–74, 478 (2010) (illustrating that 50.6% of homeless women surveyed in a 1996 National Survey of 
Health Assistance Providers and Clients had reported mental health problems within the previous year). 
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homelessness.200  While there were differences in methodology across 
different studies, making exact comparisons questionable and trend 
analysis statistically meaningless,201 even analysts who believed that 
deinstitutionalization had been a positive step agreed that the dramatic 
expansion of the homeless population in the 1980s was because large 
numbers of mentally ill persons were either released from mental hospitals 
or never committed.202 
Deinstitutionalization-induced homelessness was not only tragic for 
those living on the streets; it was a tragedy for those dying on them as well.  
At the same time that deinstitutionalization was in full swing, hypothermia 
deaths in America were on the rise.  In 1974, the death rate was 0.164 per 
100,000 people.203  By 1979, the death rate had doubled to 0.322 per 
100,000.204  Hypothermia death rates continued to rise, peaking at 0.4 per 
100,000 in 1985, before dropping back below 0.2 per 100,000 in the late 
1990s.205  Not every person who died of hypothermia was mentally ill, but 
a detailed study of hypothermia deaths in Washington, D.C. from 1972 to 
1982 found that one-third were severely malnourished, four-fifths were 
never reported missing, one-half had high blood ethanol levels, and most 
were found in abandoned buildings or vehicles.206  It is difficult to consider 
these population characteristics, which sound suspiciously like those of 
mentally ill homeless people in America, and not suspect that the increase 
in hypothermia death rates was partly attributable to deinstitutionalization. 
 
                                                                                                                          
200 See Judith A. Stein & Lillian Gelberg, Homeless Men and Women: Differential Associations 
Among Substance Abuse, Psychosocial Factors, and Severity of Homelessness, 3 EXPERIMENTAL & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 75, 76–77 (1995) (“Most data indicate that the prevalence of 
mental illness is about 20% to 30%.  For instance, a survey of homeless people in Chicago . . . found 
almost 25% had been in mental hospitals for at least 48 hr.  Nearly one half had high levels of 
depression, and one fourth showed some signs of psychotic thinking. . . . [I]ncidence of mental illness 
is found with a high frequency in well-designed studies.” (citations omitted). 
201 See RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY 
AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 4–6 (1990) (comparing the statistical analysis of the 
homeless population from various sources, including the U.S. Census and a study financed by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture).  
202 H. Richard Lamb, Foreword to THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF 
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 199, at xiii.  
203 Nicholas Rango, Exposure-Related Hypothermia Mortality in the United States, 1970–79, 74 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1159, 1159 (1984). 
204 Id. 
205 Compressed Mortality, 1979–1998 Request, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (group results by “ICD Chapter”; 
select year “1985”; then, under ICD-9 codes, open “E901”; then click “send”; repeat previous steps for 
year “1998”). 
206 Rango, supra note 203, at 1160.  
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C.  Transformed Urban Environments 
Along with its destructive effects on the mentally ill, homelessness led 
to a hard-to-measure—but nonetheless obvious—decline in the quality of 
life for the rest of society.  In many urban areas, public libraries became 
day shelters for the mentally ill.  This should be of no surprise to anyone 
who has lived in a big city during the last thirty years.  What is surprising, 
however, is how early the connection between the public library problem 
and mental illness was recognized.  In 1981, a New York Times article 
detailed how public libraries around the country were dealing with what 
the article called “problem patrons”: 
The Library of Congress in Washington has recently been 
patronized by a man wearing a yellow plastic wastebasket 
over his head, an elderly woman who sped to the stacks of 
telephone books in search of someone who had put a curse 
on her, a woman who smelled so foul she cleared one whole 
section of the main reading room, and a man the librarians 
came to call Robin Hood.  He wore a quiver of arrows, and 
spent his time at the microfilm screen reading The Los 
Angeles Times.207 
A friend of mine, Norma Kennemer, worked at the main branch of the 
Santa Rosa, California public library in the 1980s and 1990s.  She shared 
similar stories of mentally ill homeless people who would urinate in the 
corners of the library, make frightening noises, sleep at the tables, and 
generally create an environment that would have been grounds for at least 
expulsion, if not arrest and commitment, in any American public library in 
1960.  The library staff was obligated to work with such “patrons” until 
their actions became clearly criminal.  She recounted what happened when 
she observed that one of these mentally ill patrons was sitting at a table 
with his pants down to his knees.  Her supervisor was obligated by library 
rules to attempt to first resolve the problem without the police.  He 
approached this exposed “patron” and diplomatically asked, “Sir, are you 
appropriately attired for the library?” 
Why was it necessary for librarians to take this hypercautious 
approach?  Because attempts to resolve behavioral problems could lead to 
lawsuits—which was precisely the experience in Morristown, New Jersey.  
The behavior and offensive smell of a homeless person named Kreimer led 
to the adoption of a code of conduct, which prohibited loitering, 
“unnecessary staring,” and following others around the library, and also 
requiring library patrons to conform to community standards of 
                                                                                                                          
207 Gregory Jaynes, Urban Librarians Seek Ways To Deal With “Disturbed Patrons,” N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1981, at A16. 
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cleanliness.208  Kreimer filed suit against this allegedly discriminatory 
code, seeking punitive and compensatory damages “stemming from his 
ejection from the library.”209  At trial, Judge H. Lee Sarokin ruled that the 
rules were discriminatory, and the ban on annoying other patrons violated 
Kreimer’s right to freedom of speech: 
The greatness of our country lies in tolerating speech with 
which we do not agree; that same toleration must extend to 
people, particularly where the cause of revulsion may be of 
our own making.  If we wish to shield our eyes and noses 
from the homeless, we should revoke their condition, not 
their library cards.210 
Wiser heads prevailed on appeal.  The Third Circuit concluded that the 
rules were not unconstitutional and reversed Sarokin’s decision.211  
Nonetheless, the cost of fighting this suit was substantial, with Morristown 
paying $230,000 to Kreimer as a settlement for this violation of his 
rights—and, by the time it was finished, Morristown had spent more than 
one million dollars.212  The cost of fighting such lawsuits may certainly 
discourage codes of conduct in these public spaces. 
* * *  
The purpose of this disparate list of social tragedies, many far removed 
from the problem of mass murder, should be obvious: the decision to 
replace American law’s traditional view of the proper role of government 
in caring for those suffering severe mental illness problems with an 
absolutist and novel notion of due process has produced a flood of social 
problems.  Because deinstitutionalization took place over a period of more 
than a decade, and in different states in different years, the muddy water 
rose slowly.  Because the common origin of these social problems was not 
immediately obvious, it was easy to see each wave as coming from a 
separate storm.  One wave did rise rapidly: widespread homelessness 
starting in the late 1970s.  Yet social scientists studying the homelessness 
problem knew as early as 1984 that the homeless were disproportionately, 
and in some samples predominantly, mentally ill.213  The unwillingness to 
draw connections to the just-completed and radical social experiment of 
                                                                                                                          
208 Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Morristown, 765 F. Supp. 181, 183–84 (D.N.J. 1991), rev’d, 
958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992). 
209 Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1248–49. 
210 Kreimer, 765 F. Supp. at 183. 
211 Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1246. 
212 John Cichowski, Some Riders Wear Suits, Some File Them, THE RECORD (Bergen County, 
N.J.), Mar. 15, 2005. 
213 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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deinstitutionalization was more about partisan politics than about sensible 
public policy. 
VII.  THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:  
IS THERE A CONFLICT? 
There are several different ways to approach the question of whether 
there is a conflict between the Second Amendment and the rights of the 
mentally ill.  But first, it is important to recognize that absolutist positions, 
while politically satisfying and less analytically complicated, have little to 
do with the U.S. Constitution.  
As Justice Scalia’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller reminds 
us, “There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that 
the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear 
arms.  Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s 
right of free speech was not.”214  At other times the Court has reminded us 
that, no matter how strongly worded the guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
may seem: 
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments 
to the Constitution . . . were not intended to lay down any 
novel principles of government, but simply to embody 
certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited 
from our English ancestors, and which had from time 
immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized 
exceptions arising from the necessities of the case.215 
How did the United States get along for a century and a half with no 
need for firearms disability laws for the mentally ill?  Certainly, firearms 
were not in short supply in early America and—with the exception of 
blacks and Indians—the only substantial firearms regulations were those 
requiring widespread gun ownership and sometimes requiring the carrying 
of firearms.216  Nor can the dramatic and tragic increase in murder by the 
mentally ill be ascribed to changes in gun regulation, which have generally 
become more restrictive over this period.217  Nor can it be attributed to the 
                                                                                                                          
214 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
215 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).  
216 See generally CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF HOW 
AND WHY GUNS BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE 1–16, 30–38 (2006); see also Nicolas J. 
Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 1491, 1516–18 (2013) (detailing a post-Civil War movement for the right for black 
“freedmen” to keep and bear arms). 
217 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (prohibiting felons from possessing firearms or 
ammunition); id. § 922(g)(9) (prohibiting those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from 
possessing a firearm); id. § 922(r) (prohibiting certain categories of semiautomatic weapons); id. 
§ 922(t)(1) (requiring waiting periods and background checks for handgun purchases); CAL. PENAL 
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sudden availability of high-capacity semiautomatic weapons.  For example, 
the Colt AR-15, a semiautomatic version of the U.S. Army’s M-16, has 
been available with thirty-round magazines for ownership by private 
citizens since at least 1965.218  Additionally, thirteen-round semiautomatic 
pistols have been advertised for sale since at least 1954.219  Semiautomatic 
pistols with detachable magazines have been offered for sale to private 
citizens since at least 1918.220 
The lack of apparent conflict for most of our history appears to have 
been because most persons whose mental illness problems were considered 
to be a public safety concern were hospitalized.  After hospitalization, in 
most states into the 1960s, these persons were deemed legally incompetent 
and were unable, for example, to obtain a driver’s license, vote, or manage 
their financial affairs.221  A person confined to a mental hospital might 
have been able to make a constitutional argument that denial of his right to 
keep and bear arms violated either the Second Amendment or the various 
state constitution analogs.  But it seems most unlikely that, until the civil 
rights revolution of the late twentieth century, any court or lawyer would 
have taken such a claim seriously.  The severely mentally ill were (as 
today) a tiny fraction of the population, and the legal distinctions that 
treated them differently seem to have produced only occasional and very 
limited efforts at protecting their civil rights.  
VIII.  NAVIGATING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS  
There is a strong case for states to prohibit the severely mentally ill 
from possessing firearms.  Granted, crafting an exact definition for 
“severely mentally ill” presents a challenge.  The federal standard for being 
“adjudicated as a mental defective,” codified in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, 
arguably contains sufficient due process protections, as it requires a 
specific finding of dangerousness or incompetence by a court, board, 
commission, or other lawful authority.222  This standard might be 
                                                                                                                          
CODE § 30605(a) (West Supp. 2012) (criminalizing possession of certain assault weapons); see also 
Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing a 
local law that “criminalizes the possession or transfer of certain assault weapons and ammunition 
feeding devices within the city”). 
218 Paul Wahl, Now You Can Buy a Hot Combat Rifle for Sport, POPULAR SCI., Feb. 1965, at 171, 
171. 
219 See, e.g., All the World Admires Browning, LIFE, Sept. 27, 1954, at 4, 4 (advertising a 
Browning automatic pistol). 
220 See, e.g., Our Duty, POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY, Nov. 1918, at 108, 108 (advertising Colt 
weapons to civilian customers and asking them to be patient because all manufacturing capacity was 
currently being used to satisfy government contracts for the military’s effort in World War I). 
221 ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 820–22 
(1974). 
222 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2013); see supra text accompanying note 101 (presenting the regulation’s 
complete text). 
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considered an appropriate choice for the sixteen states that do not currently 
prohibit firearms possession by the mentally ill or mentally incompetent.223 
In contrast, New York State’s SAFE Act224 is clearly deficient in due 
process.  It requires physicians, psychologists, registered nurses, and 
licensed clinical social workers to report to county mental health officials 
any individual “for whom they are providing mental health treatment [that] 
is ‘likely to engage in conduct that will cause serious harm to self or 
others.’”225  If the county mental health official agrees with the report, he 
must inform the state government agency that licenses firearms ownership, 
who will then notify “the appropriate local licensing official, who must 
suspend or revoke the license as soon as practicable.”226  This involves 
immediate surrender of the firearms license and all firearms.227  
The revocation of a firearms license might be considered stigmatizing, 
but stigma alone is not sufficient to raise a due process objection.  As the 
Supreme Court has pointed out in Paul v. Davis,228 due process 
considerations under the Fourteenth Amendment requires some liberty or 
property interest to be at risk.229  The requirement that such persons must 
surrender all firearms involves both a property interest (the firearm as a 
material and presumably valuable object) and a liberty interest (the right to 
keep and bear a firearm for self-defense). 
This would seem a clear violation of existing precedents concerning 
due process.  A plethora of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have 
recognized that due process requires “an adversary hearing before an 
independent decisionmaker.”230  The gun owner accused under the SAFE 
Act enjoys no right to a hearing of any sort, much less an adversary 
hearing before the county mental health official who is the independent 
decision maker.231  Even in a time of war, “due process demands that a 
citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before 
                                                                                                                          
223 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
224 2013 N.Y. Laws Ch. 1. 
225 N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, NEW YORK SECURE AMMUNITION AND FIREARMS ENFORCEMENT 
ACT (NY SAFE ACT) GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 1 (2013) [hereinafter NY SAFE ACT GUIDANCE 
DOCUMENT], available at http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/safe_act/guidance.pdf. 
226 Id. at 2.  
227 Id. 
228 424 U.S. 693 (1976).   
229 Id. at 711–22.  For an example of state supreme courts that have recognized both a liberty and 
property interest in a concealed handgun license through state guarantees of a right to keep and bear 
arms, see Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694–95 (Ind. 1990) and Caba v. Weaknecht, 64 
A.3d 39, 63–64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013). 
230 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 485 (1980). 
231 See NY SAFE ACT GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 225, at 1–2 (failing to require notice or 
a hearing before a person can be deprived of his or her property). 
 2014] MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1339 
a neutral decisionmaker.”232  A U.S. citizen seized in time of war on a 
foreign battlefield enjoys this protection.  Why should a U.S. citizen 
accused of mental instability not enjoy at least the same opportunity to 
contest his loss of rights?  As indicated, there is also no opportunity under 
the New York SAFE Act for a gun owner to receive notice of a hearing 
before being deprived of his or her liberty.  Yet the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that due process includes prior notice of a hearing that 
deprives one of liberty.233  This right of “adequate notice” is even required 
when the deprivation of liberty is only the transfer from a prison to a 
mental hospital.234  When a convict’s parole is to be revoked, he has a right 
to advance notice of such a hearing.235  A welfare recipient enjoys the right 
to a hearing before revocation of welfare benefits.236 
Inconsistencies in existing laws and the right to an adversarial hearing 
remain, and not just in the New York SAFE Act.  For example, California 
Family Code § 6389(a) prohibits a person subject to a protective order 
from owning or possessing a firearm.237  Such protective orders may be 
issued ex parte,238 precluding a gun owner from advance notice or an 
adversarial hearing before the order takes effect.  The usual justification for 
ex parte orders is that delay may result in irreparable harm to one or more 
parties.  There are unquestionably many circumstances where failure to 
disarm a party in a domestic violence dispute has led to murder.  The 
justification for disarming a person without due process is that there is risk 
to life and limb if he is not disarmed.   
But there is no opportunity for the gun owner to cross-examine 
witnesses against him or present opposing evidence—contrary to existing 
                                                                                                                          
232 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).  
233 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (discussing how, in accordance with due 
process, students facing interference with a protected property interest “must be given some kind of 
notice and afforded some kind of hearing”); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (“[A]s to 
the basic requirement of notice itself there can be no doubt . . . .”); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the 
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, 
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 
nature of the case.”). 
234 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 485. 
235 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1972) (“[T]he parolee should be given notice 
that the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to 
believe he has committed a parole violation. The notice should state what parole violations have been 
alleged.”).  
236 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (“Under all the circumstances, we hold that 
due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and the fact that there 
is a later constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result.”). 
237 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (West 2013). 
238 Id. § 6218. 
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precedent involving revocation of welfare benefits239 or of parole.240  As 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Crawford v. Washington241 
observed, not only is there a right to cross-examine the statements of sworn 
witnesses, but also “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to 
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a 
casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”242  There is a real risk that a 
gun owner might be disarmed simply because of a misunderstanding or 
malicious falsehood and with no opportunity to correct or counter such 
errors.  
It is curious that the advocates of an exacting and absolutist due 
process requirement for involuntary commitment have shown so little 
interest in challenging this law.  The SAFE Act does not give the gun 
owner the opportunity to demand a hearing where the state must 
demonstrate by even a preponderance of evidence that his possession of 
firearms is a danger to public safety.  There does not even seem to be a 
provision for the gun owner to challenge this decision after the fact. 
Pennsylvania’s system poses a different issue.  There is a strong case 
for states to submit mental incompetence records to NICS.  But to avoid 
rendering NICS data misleading, it is imperative that states only submit 
records that conform to federal law.  While Pennsylvania’s 302 involuntary 
commitment has been upheld as conforming to due process requirements, 
it is because 302 commitments are emergency and temporary in nature.243  
If a 302 commitment is reported to NICS, the agency would prohibit the 
person reported from possessing or purchasing firearms or ammunition in 
the indefinite future, a deprivation of both liberty and property that is 
neither emergency nor temporary. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
All of these gun control-related measures are good, but they will do 
nothing for the 32.3% of murders that are committed without guns.244  Nor 
                                                                                                                          
239 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 259 (discussing the right of “personal appearance of the recipient 
before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and cross-
examination of adverse witnesses”). 
240 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487 (“At the hearing the parolee may appear and speak in his own 
behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the 
hearing officer.  On request of the parolee, a person who has given adverse information on which 
parole revocation is to be based is to be made available for questioning in his presence.”). 
241 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
242 Id. at 51.  The Crawford Court additionally provided a history of the abuses of the denial of the 
right to cross-examine witnesses and a discussion of the importance of the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantees.  Id. at 42–53. 
243 Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004). 
244 Crime in the United States 2011: Expanded Homicide Data Table 7,                                     
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-7 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
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will they do anything for murders committed by mentally incompetent 
persons who steal guns, as has been the case in at least two recent mass 
murders,245 or who buy them on the black market.246  Nor will background 
checks make a difference for persons who were not mentally ill when they 
purchased a gun.  There is also reason to wonder whether mandatory 
firearms background checks actually do anything at all.247 
There is, however, something that has been demonstrated to make a 
difference: restoring our mental hospital system—and making it more 
humane and more transparent this time.  This can be accompanied by 
involuntary outpatient commitment, which compels participation in 
outpatient treatment as a condition of not being involuntarily 
hospitalized.248 
As Harcourt’s work strongly suggests, hospitalization reduces murder 
rates.249  This is not surprising.  It is far easier to prevent inmates in locked 
wards from getting weapons than it is to prevent the mentally incompetent 
from doing so in a free society.  As Segal’s work demonstrates,250 not only 
is ease of involuntary commitment a statistically significant determinant of 
murder rates, but so are mental hospital bed availability and the quality of 
the mental health care system.  This should also not be surprising. 
If reducing murder rates were the only consequence of correcting the 
disastrous mistake of deinstitutionalization, it might be justifiable for that 
reason alone.  That is not, however, the only social gain from reversing 
course on the failure of deinstitutionalization. 
Reducing deaths from exposure should certainly qualify as a public 
good.  For all the faults of the old state mental hospitals, patients did not 
freeze to death in them or regularly die of malnutrition, tuberculosis, or the 
                                                                                                                          
245 See, e.g., Maria Sudekum Fisher, Mall Shooter Used Dead Woman’s Home                          
While She Was Still Inside, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J. (May 3, 2007), 
http://cjonline.com/stories/050307/kan_167236210.shtml (recounting how Logsdon murdered his 
neighbor to steal her late husband’s rifle); Richard A. Serrano & Alana Semuels, Suspect in Massacre 
Tried to Buy Rifle Days Before, Sources Say, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/15/nation/la-na-nn-sandy-hook-gunman-tried-to-buy-rifile-days-
before-20121215 (noting that Adam Lanza was unable to legally buy a rifle, so he stole murder weapon 
from his mother).  
246 See Lauren Dake, Oregon Gun Hearing Emotionally Charged, THE BULLETIN (Feb.                  
7, 2014), http://www.bendbulletin.com/home/1763154-151/oregon-gun-hearing-emotionally-charged# 
(discussing that proposed legislation in Oregon to expand background checks on gun sales is a 
“reasonable step” but that felons do not care if “we pass one more law”). 
247 See generally Clayton E. Cramer, Background Checks and Murder Rates (Oct. 31, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249317 
(examining statistical evidence of effect of existing mandatory state background check laws on murder 
rates using interrupted time series analysis and concluding that there is no statistically significant effect 
on murder rates). 
248 CRAMER, supra note 144, at 190–95. 
249 Harcourt, supra note 26, at 1766–73. 
250 Segal, supra note 32, at 1457. 
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other diseases that so often kill homeless people in America.  Major mental 
illness is associated with a seven to twenty-four year decrease in 
lifespan.251   
Reversing deinstitutionalization will have an economic cost, that of 
rebuilding and staffing the now abandoned mental hospitals.  But our 
current system is spending astonishing amounts of money right now 
dealing with the consequences of not institutionalizing the severely 
mentally ill.   
Mental hospitals cost money.  So do prosecutions of mentally ill 
offenders.  The average U.S. criminal justice system cost for murder in 
2008 dollars was $426,255.252  In 2014 dollars, that would be $464,817.253  
It seems likely that these costs will be borne by the state because mentally 
ill defendants are frequently indigent, and thus receive public defenders.  
The United States had 12,664 murders in 2011.254  If eighteen percent of 
those murders were by severely mentally ill offenders—a reasonable guess 
based on the Indiana murder convict data discussed above255—that is 
$1.015 billion spent on trials that could often have been preventable.  
Moreover, the costs of incarceration after conviction are substantial.  
Colorado is a pretty typical state; it currently spends $32,335 per year per 
inmate.256  A mentally sane murderer who spends thirty years in prison will 
cost $970,060 in 2011 dollars.  Multiplied by 2279 murders per year, this is 
a bill for $2.21 billion in current and accrued costs.  However, states are 
required to provide mental health services for prisoners.257  Mentally ill 
inmates are more expensive for states to care for than sane inmates.258  
Several years ago, Pennsylvania found that mentally ill prisoners cost 
                                                                                                                          
251 Edward Chesney et al., Risks of All-Cause and Suicide Mortality in Mental Disorders: A Meta-
Review, 13 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 153, 158 (2014). 
252 Matt DeLisi et al., Murder by Numbers: Monetary Costs Imposed by a Sample of Homicide 
Offenders, 21 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 501, 507 (2010). 
253 Calculated with U.S. Inflation Calculator, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2014) (insert “2008” in the first box, “426,255” in the second box, then click “calculate”).  
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255 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
256 See COLO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, BUDGET HEARING 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.tornado.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/jbc/2011-12/corhrg.pdf (noting that Colorado’s daily 
cost of incarceration was $88.59 per offender, and that the comparable average for other reporting 
states was $76.23 per offender). 
257 Know Your Rights: Medical, Dental and Mental Health Care, ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT 
6, https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file690_25743.pdf (last updated Nov. 2005) (“The 
Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide a system of ready access to adequate mental 
health care.”). 
258 See Lynne Lamberg, Efforts Grow to Keep Mentally Ill Out of Jails, 292 JAMA 555, 555 
(2004) (indicating that, according to speakers at a forum, it costs communities more to put mentally ill 
people behind bars than it does to treat them).  
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$51,100 per year and sane prisoners $28,000 per year.259  If a similar cost 
differential applies nationally, the incarceration bill is $4.03 billion a year 
in current and future costs.  In light of these figures, trial costs plus current 
and future incarceration costs would total $6.24 billion per year. 
If involuntary commitment of those with serious mental illness 
problems even prevented 455 murders a year (or twenty percent of the 
murders by severely mentally ill offenders) it could save taxpayers $547 
million per year for trials and incarceration, perhaps less, depending on the 
number of plea bargains.  That would pay for a lot of mental health 
services.  Victim costs are not included in these estimates.  It seems likely 
that anyone present at any of the recent mass murders would have gladly 
paid more taxes to hospitalize mentally ill persons before they opened fire. 
Finally, there is one other reason to admit that deinstitutionalization 
was a mistake: the mentally ill homeless are parents, children, friends, 
siblings—often too violent for family or friends to shelter, but still people 
who deserve humane care, even if we cannot cure them.  No one should be 
sleeping on a steam grate, eating out of a trashcan, or wondering whether 
he will survive the night.  Not now.  Not in our country. 
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